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I. INTRODUCTION
WKKQ is a relatively small country music station, on the air
only during the daylight hours each day, serving the small town
population of 16,000 people in Hibbing, Minnesota, and surround-
ing areas. United States Senator Wendell Anderson, a candidate
* Assistant Professor of Mass Communications and Adjunct Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of South Dakota. Formerly Attorney-Advisor, Federal Communications Commission.
B.F.A., Drake University, 1971; J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 1976. The opinions expressed
herein are those of the author.
I wish to dedicate this article to Dean John J. Broderick, a 1936 graduate of St. John's
University School of Law. Dean Broderick, Professor of Law at Notre Dame for 30 years,
inspired me as a law student and will always be my guiding light. He is a jetstream of
encouragement. He stands for all as a symbol of competence, generosity, and compassion.
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for election to the Senate in the November 1978 general election,
sought to purchase twenty-four 5-minute blocks of advertising time
on WKKQ immediately prior to the election. The station refused
the request, explaining that it did not sell 5-minute blocks of ad-
vertising time to anyone,' including its commercial, business spon-
sors. 2 WKKQ noted it was a music and news station whose fast-
paced programming format necessitated a policy of refusing to sell
any advertising time beyond the length of a 1-minute spot
announcement.'
Emphasizing that it was not attempting to deny Senator An-
derson or any other political candidate access to the air, 4 but was
merely protecting its format from disruption by treating Senator
Anderson exactly the same as it treated all other business and po-
litical advertisers, WKKQ sold the Anderson campaign seventy-
five spot announcements to be run during the final 8 days before
the election. 5
Unsatisfied, the Anderson campaign threatened the radio sta-
tion that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Com-
mission) would be contacted to force the station to sell the 5-min-
ute segments.' To the possibility that it might be compelled to
Senator Wendell Anderson, 69 F.C.C.2d 1265 (1978). In broadcasting, advertisements
of 1-minute in length are known as "spots" and those of 5-minutes or longer are referred to
as "program length" ads.
Ads are also classified on the basis of placement. Run-of-schedule ads can be aired
whenever the station chooses, can be moved for fixed position ads, and are sold at relatively
low rates. Fixed-position ads are sold for airing at a specific time or during a specific pro-
gram and are more expensive. See Holden E. Sanders, 52 F.C.C.2d 592, 592-93 (1975).
Primetime is that period of the broadcasting day characterized by peak audience poten-
tial. For a radio station such as WKKQ, prime time includes those morning and afternoon
hours that maximum numbers listen to the radio on the way to or from work - commonly
known as "drive time." Prime time for a television station, on the other hand, is during the
evening hours when most people are at home.
2 69 F.C.C.2d at 1266. But see id. at 1267 n.3. Although WKKQ has an established
policy of refusing to sell time segments longer than spot announcements to anyone for the
purpose of advertising, it does present program length material in its typical broadcast day.
WKKQ features one half-hour of news and two 4-minute religious programs a day, as well as
a half-hour religious program once a week. Id.
3 Id. at 1266.
A candidate for federal office is entitled to reasonable access to the airwaves. 47
U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976); see A. SAPmO, MEDiA AccEss 39 (1976). See generally Note, The
Right of "Reasonable Access" for Federal Political Candidates Under Section 312(a)(7) of
the Communications Act, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1287 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Reasonable
Access].
1 69 F.C.C.2d at 1266.
6 Id. The FCC is a regulatory agency created by the Communications Act of 1934 (the
Act), ch. 6652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)). The Act was
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offer 5-minute commercials, WKKQ responded by setting a charge-
able rate of eighty dollars for any commercial of such length. 7
On October 26, 12 days before the election, a representative of
Senator Anderson filed a formal complaint with the FCC. The
complaint charged that WKKQ's refusal to sell 5-minute blocks of
time was unlawful, violating the Communications Act of 1934 (the
Act),, as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA).1 Further, the complaint contended that the $80 rate had
been intentionally set outrageously high by the station to discour-
age Senator Anderson from purchase, a practice which was also im-
proper on the station's part. 0
designed to centralize authority in order to regulate interstate and foreign commerce by wire
and radio and to provide a communication service which was efficient and which could be
available to all at reasonable rates. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). The FCC consists of seven Com-
missioners appointed by the President for 7-year terms. Id. § 154(a)(c). The powers accorded
the agency to effectuate the execution and enforcement of the provisions of the Act are broad
and ill-defined. The Act gives the FCC the right to promulgate rules and regulations in order
to promote its purpose, id. § 303(r), and violation of a Commission rule is grounds for revo-
cation of a license to operate, id. § 312(a)(4). See generally Robinson, The Federal Commu-
nications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. Rav. 169 (1978).
The provisions relating to FCC regulation of radio broadcasting are contained in 47
U.S.C. ch. 5, subch. HI (1976). The FCC is empowered to issue licenses, id. § 303(l)(1),
classify radio stations, id. § 303(a), prescribe the qualifications needed to gain a license, id.
303 (1)(1), require certain record keeping by station owners, id. § 303(j), and generally make
all rules necessary to carry out the provisons of the Act, id. § 303(r). The conditions and
limitations upon licensees are enumerated, as well as administrative sanctions if these con-
ditions are not met. Id. § 312. The Act specifically prohibits censorship or any interference
with the right of free speech. Id. § 326. See generally W. FRANcoIs, MAss MEDIA LAW AND
REGULATON 431-65 (2d ed. 1978).
The extent to which the FCC can prescribe affirmative duties for broadcasters has been
clarified by the courts in cases involving both radio, see, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1975), and cable television,
see, e.g., Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), affl'd, 440 U.S. 689
(1979).
69 F.C.C.2d at 1266.
Ch. 6652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)).
Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 4 (1972)(codified in scattered sections of 2, 47 U.S.C.).
WKKQ was alleged to have violated § 312(a)(7) and § 315(b) of the Act. 69 F.C.C.2d at
1265-66; see notes 29-30 and accompanying text infra. The basis of the complaint brought on
behalf of Senator Anderson was that failure to sell time of more than a minute in duration is
unreasonable and therefore "appears contrary" to the Congressional intent of § 312(a)(7). 69
F.C.C.2d at 1265-66.
11 69 F.C.C.2d at 1265. The complaint stated that by establishing an "artificially high"
rate for a 5-minute segment of air time the station was making an "effort to discourage the
candidate from exercising his rights to 'reasonable access.'" Id. If so, this action would con-
stitute a violation of the general purposes of the Federal Election Campaign Act, which was
enacted to allow the public to be better informed by giving the candidates access to the
media with rates on a par with commercial advertisers. See generally Wick, The Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 and Political Broadcast Reform, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 582
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On October 31, by a 4-2 vote the Commission adopted a deci-
sion in response to the Anderson complaint." The decision ordered
WKKQ to sell Senator Anderson 5-minute blocks of advertising
time. 12 Moreover, the Commission found the $80 rate to be unrea-
sonable on the record before it, and ordered the station to either
justify the amount or reduce it. 13
(1973). Congress was concerned about the spiraling costs of election campaigns and therefore
now requires that a licensee charge a political candidate the "lowest unit charge" for that
length and type of time segment 60 days preceding the date of a general election. 47 U.S.C.
§ 315(b)(1) (1976); see S. REP. No. 96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1971), reprinted in [1972]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1773, 1774; S. REP. No. 229, 92 Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1971),
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1821, 1822.
Few problems have arisen regarding the meaning of "lowest unit charge." This may be
due to the clear Congressional intent to "place the candidate on par with a broadcaster's
most favored commercial advertiser" during the crucial period immediately prior to an elec-
tion or primary. S. REP. No. 96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1773, 1780. Regularly, under § 315(b) (2), candidates will be charged rates
"comparable" to those charged other users. They need not be afforded the same special rate
or deal given a purchaser of a large amount of advertising time. When the time period de-
scribed in § 315(b)(1) is in effect, however, a broadcaster is obligated, under this "lowest
unit charge" provision, to give the candidate the same rate given to a bulk purchaser, even if
the candidate does not purchase that quantity of time. See A. SHAPIRo, MEMA AccESs 97-99
(1976). In other words, the candidate is entitled to pay no more than the best rate the licen-
see charges a commercial advertiser for the type and length of ad bought. For a discussion of
the meaning of "type" and "length" under § 315(b)(1), see Holden E. Sanders, 52 F.C.C.2d
592, 593-94 (1975).
11 Senator Wendell Anderson, 69 F.C.C.2d 1265 (1978). Voting in the majority were
Chairman Ferris and Commissioners Quello, Fogarty, and Brown; Commissioners Lee and
White dissented.
12 Id. at 1267. The Commission reasoned that given the purposes of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, an affirmative obligation is imposed upon the licensee to afford cer-
tain time lengths to political candidates for federal office regardless of their policy towards
commercial advertisers. In other words, it is not enough for the station to assert that it does
not permit anyone to purchase 5-minute segments of time. Id. at 1266. The Commission
relied on its Report and Order on Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7), 43 Fed.
Reg. 36,342 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Report & Order], wherein the FCC stated "a
station may not refuse all requests for time simply because they do not fit into the station's
particular format . . . . A station that normally broadcasts only music and spot announce-
ments will not be meeting its obligation if it refuses to accept or schedule any political dis-
cussion running longer than one minute." Id. at 36, 382-83.
Although Commissioners Fogarty and Quello agreed that the Commission's Rules re-
quired the station to accept 5-minute political ads, each was disturbed by the result reached
in this case. Commissioner Queflo indicated the rule should be modified, and Commisioner
Fogarty questioned the rule's purpose. See FCC forces station to take five-minute political
spot, BROADCAS TNG, Nov. 6, 1978, at 52.
11 69 F.C.C.2d at 1268. The FCC found the quoted rate to be violative of the lowest unit
charge provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. Id. at 1267; see note 9 supra.
The majority went on to explain that it was not fixing the rates licensees must charge, but
that the licensee must justify its rates by showing a reasonable relation between the amount
charged for program time and spot announcements. Id. The licensee in this case ordinarily
charged $6.48 for a prime-time, 60-second spot and $21,60 for a single prime-time spot. 69
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In a blistering dissent, Commissioner Margita White charac-
terized the majority's reasoning as "pious nonsense,"" and "be-
yond any reasonable construction of its alleged statutory author-
ity,"' 5 and the decision as an "impermissible and unparalleled
intrusion,"'" and an effort "to expand the Commission's regulatory
reach.' 7 As Commissioner White saw it, "[t]he majority here has
ignored fifty years of legislative and regulatory wisdom."' What
makes her jarring attack even more pronounced is the amiable and
urbane comradery typical of the Commission, and the conspicuous
reluctance on the part of individual Commissioners to indignantly
denounce, even in dissenting opinions, any colleagues over policy
differences.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the WKKQ decision
in terms of the relevant statutes, 9 and Commission 2 and judicial2'
precedents in an effort to determine whether the decision was be-
yond the authority of the Commission and susceptible to reversal
F.C.C.2d at 1266 n.2. Therefore, the Commission held that the licensee's rate for a 5-minute
political program, being nearly thirteen times the rate for a spot announcement, bore no
reasonable relation to the lowest unit charge. Id. at 1268. The FCC required the station to
rebut the presumption of unreasonableness by showing that the charge actually does bear a
reasonable relation to the lowest unit charge or to show why the lowest unit charge cannot be
used. Id.
1' 69 F.C.C.2d at 1270-72. (White, Comm'r, dissenting); see notes 74-79 and accompany-
ing text infra.
Id. at 1271 (White, Comm'r, dissenting).
" Id. at 1272 (White, Comm'r, dissenting).
'7 Id. (White, Comm'r, dissenting).
" Id. (White, Comm'r, dissenting). Commissioner White pointed out that Section 3(h)
of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976), specifically states that a
broadcaster is not a common carrier. Therefore, regulation of its specific rates is unjustified.
69 F.C.C.2d at 1271 (White, Comm'r, dissenting). She also noted that Congress, when enact-
ing § 315, made it clear that "rates would not be regulated [although] discrimination in
charges to candidates were prohibited." Id. (White, Comm'r, dissenting); see notes 234-235
and accompanying text infra.
" See notes 24-36 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 87-161 and accompanying text infra.
21 See notes 175-246 and accompanying text infra.
2 The FCC derives its authority from Congress, which has delegated to it the responsi-
bility of regulating the airwaves. See note 6 supra. The scope of authority the FCC has
received by way of the Communications Act of 1934 is expansive. See National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). In National Broadcasting the Court rejected the
contention that the FCC was restricted to resolving technological problems or objections to
the granting of a license, such as determining whether there are too many stations in that
area already, and if another station would interfere with the existing broadcast frequencies.
Id. at 215-18. The Supreme Court stated that Congress did not "frustrate the pupose for
which the Communications Act of 1934 was brought into being by attempting an itemized
catalogue of the specific manifestations of the general problems for the solution of which it
was establishing a regulatory agency." Id. at 219. See generally D. P.MBER, MAss MEDiA LAW
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on reconsideration by the FCC or on appeal to the courts.3
II. THE APPLICABLE LAW
By enacting the landmark Communications Act of 1934,24 Con-
gress created the Federal Communications Commission as an ex-
pert, independent regulatory agency. Among its other responsibili-
ties, the Commission is empowered by the terms of the Act to
extensively regulate radio broadcasting throughout the nation.2
The cutting edge of the FCC's broadcasting jurisdiction is its li-
censing power; 2 no radio station can broadcast without an FCC li-
387-430 (1977).
Appeals from all orders of the Commission, except those granting or refusing an
application for a construction permit, a station license or its renewal or modification, or sus-
pending an operator's license, can be sought through application to the United States Court
of Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1976). In all other cases, an appeal may be taken to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by an unsuccessful applicant, a sus-
pended operator, or "any other person who is aggrieved or whose interests are adversely
affected by" the Commission's order. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1976). Also, any decision by the
court of appeals is subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States. 47 U.S.C.
§ 402(j) (1976); see note 83 infra.
WKKQ and the national broadcast industry have petitioned the FCC to reconsider this
decision. See note 83 infra.
24 Ch. 6652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)).
47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976); see notes 26-36 and accompanying text infra. See also Federal
Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279-85 (1933).
Procedurally, the FCC usually receives a complaint about a broadcaster from the candi-
date or his representative. The complaint must establish a prima facie case of a violation or
no further action will be taken. American Security Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607
F.2d 438, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Melbourne Noel, Jr., 66 F.C.C.2d 1063, 1064 (1976). Next,
the FCC investigates the complaint by mail or phone, depending on the circumstances.
Should this investigation show the licensee to have acted unreasonably, the station must
rebut the evidence or be charged with the violation. Few complaints reach the stage where
the broadcaster needs to reply. American Security Council Educ. Foundation v. F.C.C., 607
F.2d 438, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1979) In 1973, of 2400 complaints, 94 required licensee responses. Id.
See generally W. FRANcoIs, MASS MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 434-35 (2d ed. 1978).
25 The licensing powers of the Commission are enumerated in 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303,
307-312 (1976), and 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.511, .533, .538-.539, .540, .541, .591 -. 592, .593, .597, .601,
.605 (1978). The FCC receives complaints covering a wide variety of subjects, see, e.g.,
FCC FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 226-27 (1976), and FCC response may take a variety of
forms. B. COLE & M. OE'rINGER, RErucTANr REGULATORS 190-202 (1978). Revocation of a
broadcaster's license, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1976), is the most serious response.
For this reason and also because a timely response is essential in order to remedy a licensee's
violation, the Commission generally handles complaints when they arrive. See National
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910
(1975). After the immediate dispute is resolved, however, the FCC may reconsider the viola-
tion when the broadcaster's license is renewed. See, e.g., Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI
(FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975), rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
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cense.27 Upon application to the Commission, a station can be ini-
tially granted and subsequently awarded renewal of a 3-year,
limited right, expiring license to broadcast if its operation inures to
the benefit of the public.2s
Such a federal license comes to the local broadcaster with
strings of responsibilities attached. With an FCC license to broad-
cast, certain obligations are imposed on the station. Literally scores
of such obligations and conditions have been congressionally man-
dated and thus appear as substantive provisions of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934, as amended. Two such obligations stand as the
touchstones of the WKKQ case:
Section 312:
(a) The Commission may revoke any station license or
construction permit -
(7) for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable ac-
cess to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of
time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally
qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of
his candidacy. 9
Section 315(b):
The charges made for the use of any broadcasting station by
any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public of-
fice . . . shall not exceed-
(1) . . . during the sixty days preceding the date of the general
or special election in which such person is a candidate, the lowest
unit charge of the station for the same class and amount of time
- 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
21 Id. at §§ 303, 307(a), 307(d), 309(a). The FCC may only grant a license for the opera-
tion of broadcasting station for a 3-year period. At the end of the period the license may be
renewed if the Commission "finds that public interest, convenience, and necessity would be
served thereby." Id. § 307(d).
There is no specific definition of "public interest, convenience or necessity." The FCC
has articulated the belief that a licensee must, in order to meet its obligation to serve the
public, make a "diligent, positive and continuing effort to discover and fulfill the tastes,
needs and desires of its community." National Broadcasting Co., 47 F.C.C.2d 803, 810
(1974). The Commission has also developed extensive rules and policies which provide some
idea of what the FCC deems to be acting in the public interest. In Commission's En Banc
Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C.2d 2303 (1960), for example, the FCC sets forth elements it
has found necessary for a station to provide in order to meet their public interest obligation.
Among the elements listed are public affairs programs, political broadcasts, and opportunity
for local self-expression. Id. at 2314.
n 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976); see notes 87-171 and accompanying text infra.
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for the same period .... 10
It is the delegated responsibility of the Commission to enforce and
interpret all provisions of the Act.' In discharging these duties
with respect to sections 312 and 315, the FCC has been prolific in
issuing policy statements," public notices, 33 rules, 3 primers for can-
didates and broadcasters, 35 and decisions resolving specific cases
and issues.3 6
10 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1976). This provision has generally been interpreted as requiring
the licensee to place the candidate at least on a par with their commercial advertisers. See,
e.g., Anthony Martin-Trigona, 64 F.C.C.2d 1087, 1090 (1977). Therefore, if a station charges
ten Olollars for one spot announcement and $7.50 per spot if ten are brought at one time, for
the 60 days preceeding'a general election, the station must charge a political candidate $7.50
for one spot announcement. The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 43 Fed.
Reg. 36,342, 36,348 (1978). Section 315(b)(1) has also been interpreted to mean that if spot
time segments are made available to commercial advertisers they must be made available to
candidates. See Campaign '76 Media Communications, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 1142, 1144 (1976).
31 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976); see notes 6 and 22 supra.
31 A policy statement is an exposition of the FCC's interpretation of a particular phase
of its duties to regulate the airwaves, and how it could be expected to react to certain licen-
see practices. See, e.g., Political Spot Announcements on Radio, 59 F.C.C.2d 103 (1976),
modified on other grounds, 72 F.C.C.2d 255 (1979); Commission's En Banc Programming
Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 303 (1960).
" A public notice issued by the Commission will focus on a particular issue which the
FCC views as needing clarification and so it will set guidelines for broadcasters to follow.
See, e.g., The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 55 F.C.C.2d 279 (1975);
Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 24 F.C.C.2d 832 (1970).
!31 Rulemaking proceedings consider whether a change in the Commission's stance on a
topic should be made. Such change may be premised on new factual situations or novel
arguments. See John Cervase, 44 F.C.C.2d 744, 746-47 (1974). The FCC is empowered by
Congress with broad discretion to "[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such
restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this chapter." 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976). Such rule-making documents, in addi-
tion to opinions and orders, final decisions and documents contained in FCC Reports, and
formal policy statements and interpretations, have precedential value if published in the
Federal Register.
If the [rule-making documents] . . . are published in the FEDERAL REGISTER
[or] the F.C.C. Reports, . . . they may be relied upon, used or cited as precedent
by the Commission or private parties in any matter. If they are not so published,
they may not be relied upon, used or cited as precedent, except against persons
who have actual notice of the document in question or by such persons against the
Commission.
47 C.F.R. § 0.445(e) (1978). But see Senator Wendell Anderson, 69 F.C.C.2d 1265, 1270 n.2
(1978) (White, Comm'r, dissenting)(political primer no more than "reference tool and has no
force and effect of law").
u A primer recapitulates and expands prior statements and decisions by the Commis-
sion in a given area. See, e.g., The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 43 Fed.
Reg. 36, 342 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Political Primer].
11 See notes 120-171 infra.
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I. THE IssuEs
The issues in the WKKQ case were well-defined. The com-
plaint argued that the refusal of the station to sell the requested 5-
minute ad violated the reasonable access obligations imposed on
the station by section 312(a)(7) .7 Secondly, the complaint charac-
terized the $80 rate set by the broadcaster as "artificially high...
to discourage the candidate from exercising" his reasonable access
rights.n It was contended that such attempted discouragement in
itself violated section 312(a)(7) by contravening the spirit of the
provision and circumventing the access rights of the candidate. 9
The station's response was simply that it had an established
policy of selling absolutely no 5-minute advertising time to any
prospective buyer-commercial or political. It was explained that
such a deliberate policy was justified by its concern to keep intact
its news, music, and spot announcement format. The broadcaster
insisted that such a business judgment was fully within its own
discretion and that section 312(a)(7) did not require a disruption of
this type of format."
With respect to the rate issue, WKKQ protested that it was
axiomatic that the FCC had no authority to regulate advertising
rates charged by broadcast stations." The station's position was
11 69 F.C.C.2d at 1265.
SId.
' Id. The spirit of the provision, as indicated by the purpose of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, was to assure an informed electorate by making the mass media
available to candidates. By imposing an artificially high rate, the charge could easily be
deemed prohibitive, and therefore the candidate would be unable to achieve the public expo-
sure necessary to present his views to the citizens.
11 Id. at 1266; see 1978 Report and Order, supra note 12, at 33,770. In the Report and
Order, the Commission expressed its belief that the policy of reasonable access to the air for
candidates for federal office would not necessitate a disruption of a broadcaster's schedule.
Generally, the FCC gives the licensee a broad discretion in planning its format and pro-
gramming: "[Q]uestions will not be raised about program scheduling decisions absent a spe-
cific showing that the licensee could not reasonably expect that the broadcast would be ef-
fective." National Broadcasting Co., 47 F.C.C.2d 803, 806 (1974). In order to fulfill its
obligation to serve the public interest, a station must be free to ascertain the needs of its
community and respond to them. See Chronicle Broadcasting Co., 44 F.C.C.2d 717, 722
(1974), aff'd sub nom. Committee for Open Media v. F.C.C., 543 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Twin States Broadcasting, Inc., 42 F.C.C.2d 1091, 1092-93 (1973). The FCC, having given
the licensee discretion in programming and scheduling matters, hesitates to substitute its
judgment for that of the licensee. See Campaign '76 Media Communications, Inc., 58
F.C.C.2d 1142, 1143-44 (1976); Honorable Pete Flaherty, 48 F.C.C.2d 838, 848 (1974); Rea-
sonable Access, supra note 4, at 1295; note 4 supra.
"1 69 F.C.C.2d at 1266.
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that the law and the intent of Congress 42 were unequivocal that the
FCC could not regulate advertising rates 3 and that this was re-
flected by the Commission's action in the past."
IV. THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION
With the issues clearly framed, the Commission ordered
WKKQ to sell the 5"-minute segments and to either justify or re-
duce the $80 rate. 5 The decision addressed the station's argument
that it sold no 5-minute blocks to even its business advertisers,
flatly ruling that "[1easonable access imposes an affirmative
obligation on licensees, standing independely of their commer-
cial practices."46 The opinion offered a precedential litany for this
proposition. First, a public notice issued in 1968 (1968 Public
Notice) 7 alerted broadcasters that programming format modifica-
tions might be necessary to meet political broadcast obligations."8
Additionally, a public notice issued in 1974 (1974 Public Notice)"
declared that the purpose of the FECA amendments was to allow
federal candidates to explain exhaustively their positions for the
benefit of a fully informed electorate. 0 Further, the Commission
42 See S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); notes 43, 234, 235 infra.
'3 As Commissioner White pointed out in her dissent, 67 F.C.C.2d at 1271 (White,
Comm'r, dissenting), during the drafting of the Radio Act of 1927, Congress rejected classify-
ing broadcasters as common carriers, see notes 79 & 129 and accompanying text infra. It
thus appears that if the legislature had intended broadcasters to be subject to rate regula-
tion by a government agency they would have provided for such by including broadcasters
within the term common carrier. See 69 F.C.C.2d at 1271 (White, Comm'r, dissenting); S.
REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
1 See, e.g., Kays, Inc., 43 F.C.C.2d 1183 (1973). See also Southern Radio & TV Corp.,
43 F.C.C.2d 714 (1973).
" 69 F.C.C.2d at 1268.
4 Id. at 1266.
" Public Notice - Licensee Responsibility as to Political Broadcasts, 15 F.C.C.2d 94
(1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Public Notice].
" Id. The FCC wished to call to the attention of the licensees that it was desired that
licensees make "their facilities effectively available to candidates for political office even
though this may require modification of normal station format." Id. The Commission recog-
nized the importance of political broadcasts and encouraged the licensee to take steps in
assuring that this aspect of the public need would be met. Id.
11 Concerning Licensee Responsibility under Amendments to the Communications Act
made by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 47 F.C.C.2d 516 (1974), overruled in
part, Anthony Martin-Trigona, 64 F.C.C.2d 1087 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Public
Notice].
11 47 F.C.C.2d at 517. The Commission reminded licensees that Congress intended in
passing the FECA "to ensure candidates for Federal elective office adequate opportunity to
present and discuss their candidacies and hence provide the voters with information neces-
sary for the responsible exercise of their franchise." Id. at 517; see note 39 supra.
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observed, a 1978 public notice (1978 Political Primer)5' stated that
music, news, and spot announcement stations would not be in
compliance with section 312(a)(7) if they refused to sell 5-minute
program-length segments.2 Finally, a 1978 enforcement order (1978
Report and Order)53 explained that reasonable access meant noth-
ing less than making 5-minute segments available to candidates
during prime time.54 The decision acknowledged that the 1974 Pub-
lic Notice and the 1978 Political Primer had held out to broadcast-
ers that noncompliance with the enumerated responsibilities was
possibly acceptable under certain extenuating circumstances.5 The
FCC noted, however, that WKKQ had made no such showing in
this case.5
Turning to the eighty-dollar rate issue, the majority concluded
that the station's rate was "unreasonable in light of the history and
purpose of the FECA."'' The decision identified as one purpose the
reduction of candidates' campaign expenses by inaugurating the
lowest unit charge rule. In those instances in which a station in
fact had no established rate, as here, one must be set, and the deci-
sion stated it must also be a lowest unit charge.5
There were two separate standards to which the station was
held on the rate issue by the majority. The first was that WKKQ
must be reasonable in setting its rates." In deciding that the rate
was unreasonable, the Commission found it significant that the 5-
5' 1978 Political Primer, supra note 35.
52 See id. at 36, 382-83. In the Political Primer, the FCC explained that "a station that
normally broadcasts only music and spot announcements will not be meeting its obligation if
it refuses to accept or schedule any political discussion running longer than one minute." Id.
(citing the 1968 Public Notice, supra note 47).
3 1978 Report and Order, supra note 12).
1, Id. at 33,770. The majority stated: "'absent certain unusual circumstances. .. "rea-
sonable access" requires that a legally qualified candidate be afforded program time in
prime time.' This statement does not contain any qualification that this requirement applies
only if the licensee sells program time to commercial advertisers." 67 F.C.C.2d at 1267
(quoting 1978 Report and order, supra note 12).
11 69 F.C.C.2d at 1267. The countervailing circumstances referred to by the majority
have usually been inferred to mean a multiplicity of candidates or a donation of free time by
the station. See Summa Corp., 43 F.C.C.2d 602, 605 (1973).
11 69 F.C.C.2d at 1267.
57 Id.; see note 9 supra.
69 F.C.C.2d at 1267-68.
5' Id. at 1267.
Id. The Commission does not usually attempt a determination of the reasonableness
of rates charged by broadcasters. It confines itself to a ruling on whether the lowest unit
charge has been afforded a political candidate, and whether a station has been discrimina-
tory in the rates charged different candidates. See notes 186-199 infra.
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minute rate was fully thirteen times the lowest unit rate charged
by WKKQ for a 1-minute spot. To the Commissioners, the 5-min-
ute rate thus bore "no reasonable relation to the lowest unit charge
that is applicable to spot announcements."'" As the decision ex-
tolled, unreasonableness in the setting of rates would thwart the
purposes of sections 312 and 315, discourage candidates from abun-
dantly communicating their views to the electorate, and raise seri-
ous questions about the true motivation of the broadcaster in es-
tablishing such rates.12
The second standard used by the Commission was the general
public interest standard which all broadcast licensees must meet.13
FCC broadcast licenses are conditioned on the licensee operating in
the public interest, as defined by the FCC.14 The concern of the
majority was that high political advertising rates could deter, limit,
or silence political broadcasts, which are a part of the overall pro-
gramming obligations of licensees. 5 If political broadcasts were
thus deterred, there would be a question whether the licensee was
meeting all its programming obligations, and thus serving the pub-
lic interest.
The majority concluded that WKKQ had met neither rate
standard and therefore had acted unreasonably, in violation of sec-
tions 312 and 315. The station was offered the option of justifying
its rate by the Commission's standards, which would involve per-
suading the Commissioners that an extenuating circumstance pre-
vented the use of the lowest unit charge or that the eighty dollar
rate was reasonably related to the lowest unit charge." Whether
such option was illusory, given that the majority had already con-
cluded there was no reasonable relationship between WKKQ's rate
and the lowest unit charge, was a determination for the station to
make. The holding of the case appears to be that absent such justi-
fication, the rate must be revised.67 The Commission did not, how-
ever, indicate with exactness what the new rate should be. Ex-
plaining that it was not infringing on WKKQ's discretion to set its
66 69 F.C.C.2d at 1267.
62 Id. at 1268.
" Id. at 1267-68.
6, See note 28 supra.
" See id.
69 F.C.C.2d at 1268. The majority saw high advertising rates as "discouraging legally
qualified Federal candidates from seeking program time to present their views on public
issues." Id.
67 Id.
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own rates, or in any sense fixing rates, the majority simply set forth
the general rate standards and ordered they be met."
V. DIsSENTING STATEMENTS
In separate statements, two commissioners dissented to the
majority's decision. Commissioner Robert E. Lee disagreed with
the majority's perception that Commission precedent mandated
the result. 9 To the contrary, he argued, the 1974 Public Notice
upon which the majority essentially based its conclusion had been
overruled by the Commission in its 1977 Martin-Trigona° decision.
He explained that the 1977 opinion held the reasonable access pro-
visions did not "mandate access to any particular length or class of
time."'7 Further, Commissioner Lee noted Martin-Trigona stood for
the proposition that licensees have the discretion to decide how
their facilities will be used to afford political access, subject only to
a narrow FCC review for reasonableness. 72 Under the Martin-'
Trigona standard, Commissioner Lee contended that WKKQ's re-
fusal to sell 5-minute segments was reasonable, which was demon-
strated by the station's showing that its policy of banning program-
length ads was uniformly applied to commercial and political ad-
vertisers, that its format would be otherwise disrupted, and that it
had agreed to afford Senator Anderson extensive access by selling
him dozens of 1-minute spots. 7
The second dissenter, Commissioner Margita E. White, was
severely critical of the decision .7 With respect to ordering WKKQ
to sell the ads, Commissioner White challenged the majority that
Commission precedent should have forced the opposite result. She
referred to the language in the 1978 Report and Order that licen-
sees could "follow usual commercial practices" in meeting their po-
6 Id. at 1267. The station was ordered to advise the Commission by 4:00 p.m. the next
day exactly how it planned to meet its reasonable access obligation to Senator Anderson, as
interpreted and defined in the decision. Id.
11 69 F.C.C.2d at 1268-69 (Lee, Comm'r, dissenting).
70 Anthony Martin-Trigona, 64 F.C.C.2d 1087 (1977); see notes 134-142 and accompany-
ing text infra. In Martin-Trigona, the Commission specifically overruled Campaign '76 Me-
dia Comm'n, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 1142 (1976), and the 1974 Public Notice to the extent that
they "granted access to particular units of time based on section 315(b)." 64 F.C.C.2d at
1091.
11 69 F.C.C.2d at 1269 (Lee, Comm'r, dissenting); see Anthony Martin-Trigona, 64
F.C.C.2d at 1090-91; note 70 supra.
72 69 F.C.C.2d at 1269 (Lee, Comm'r, dissenting).
3Id.
" Id. at 1270-72 (White, Comm'r, dissenting).
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litical access obligations. 5 She noted that WKKQ's usual commer-
cial practice was to sell no 5-minute ad time to any potential
advertiser. The station, declared Commissioner White, should thus
be allowed to continue its usual 5-minute ad policy without Com-
mission disturbance.
Alternatively, the White dissent insisted that the station's
access policy was reasonable and should therefore be affirmed. She
contended that reasonableness was shown when WKKQ met
Senator Anderson's political communications needs by selling him
seventy-five 1-minute spots for the last 8 days of the election
campaign."6
Addressing the eighty dollar rate issue, Commissioner White's
dissent complained that the Commission's decision "went beyond
any reasonable construction of its alleged statutory authority."77
She explained that the section 315(b) lowest-unit-charge require-
ment was inapplicable and could not serve as a basis for the
WKKQ order since it merely placed a candidate on a lowest rate
par with the station's most favored commercial advertiser.78 She ar-
gued that because WKKQ did not sell 5-minute time to business
advertisers, it had no 5-minute lowest rate for commercial, busi-
ness advertisers, and, therefore, section 315(b) plainly did not ap-
ply. The dissent further maintained section 312(a)(7) did not con-
fer rate authority either, as it dealt only with insuring candidates'
access.
79
The dissent denounced the decision as exceeding the Commis-
sion's authority, as found in sections 312 and 315 and disparaged
the majority for going beyond the intent of Congress as it had been
clearly identified in legislative histories dating to 1927.11
,1 Id. at 1270 (White, Comm'r, dissenting)(quoting 1978 Report and Order, supra note
12, at 33,770). In the Report and Order quoted by Commissioner White, the Commission
assured licensees that compliance with political access requirements would not necessitate a
disruption of their broadcast schedule; they need only allow that time which they afford
commercial advertisers to be available for political candidates. 1978 Report and Order, supra
note 12, at 33,770.
76 69 F.C.C.2d at 1270-71 (White, Comm'r, dissenting).
Id. at 1271 (White, Comm'r, dissenting); see note 6 supra.
' 69 F.C.C.2d at 1271 (White, Comm'r, dissenting).
" Id. at 1271-72 (White, Comm'r, dissenting).
Id. at 1272 (White, Comm'r, dissenting); see notes 31-32 supra. There is scant legisla-
tive history focusing on section 312(a)(7). See Reasonable Access, supra note 4, at 1292-93.
Commissioner White vigorously argued that the FCC by law could regulate only rates
charged by communications common carriers (telephone, telegraph, and satellite communi-
cations), see notes 234-35 and accompanying text infra, and that Congress had never equiv-
ocated in its determination that broadcasters are not common carriers and thus not subject
to rate regulation. See note 18 supra. She protested that in drafting, debating, and enacting
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VI. REACTION TO THE DECISION
Not unpredictably, WKKQ responded to the Commission's de-
cision by telegraphing Senator Anderson its willingness to sell him
one 5-minute ad on each of the 5 days prior to the election. Fur-
ther, the Senator was quoted a revised rate of either thirty-one dol-
lars for prime time or twenty-six dollars for run-of-schedule. 8' Each
5-minute rate was proportional to the 1-minute rate charged by the
station. A copy of the telegram was immediately forwarded to the
FCC.
Quickly recognizing the landmark status of the FCC's ruling,
the news media accorded it extensive coverage. 2 Legal reaction fol-
lowed shortly thereafter. The FCC and Senator Anderson had won
the skirmish with the small Minnesota radio station, but the na-
tional broadcasting industry, acknowledging the precedential na-
ture of the decision and its potentially far-reaching adverse conse-
quences to all broadcasters, allied itself with WKKQ and swiftly
reacted by mounting an all-out attack on the Commission's deci-
sion. Shortly after the release of the decision, the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters (NAB), the well-known trade association rep-
resenting more than 5,000 radio and television stations across the
the statutes that created the Federal Radio Commission in 1927 and its successor, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission in 1934, Congress deliberately and meticulously avoided
conferring any jurisdiction on either agency to regulate the advertising rates charged by
broadcasters. 69 F.C.C.2d at 1271 (White, Comm'r, dissenting); see 79 CONG. Rac. 11240
(1934); note 8 supra.
81 Western Union Mailgram from Jerry J. Collins, President, WKKQ, Inc. to D.J.
Leary, Campaign Media Consultants, Minneapolis, Minnesota, October 31, 1978.
12 The Associated Press wire reported the decision and noted: "[tihe precedent-setting
ruling broadens previous FCC rules on accepting political ads, and is expected to anger
many broadcasters." Political Time, Associated Press wire story, Item No. B-145 (Nov. 2,
1978). As the AP explained the significance of the case to its members and in turn to their
many readers and listeners: "Up until Tuesday [when the decision was adopted] the FCC
only required stations to accept [political] ads equal in length to what they had sold to
regular advertisers." Id. Broadcasting magazine, a preeminent national trade journal of the
broadcast industry, heralded the news under a headline reading: "FCC forces station to take
five-minute political spot." FCC forces station to take five-minute political spot, BROADCAST-
ING, Nov. 6, 1978, at 52, col. 3.
The local and regional newspapers in northern Minnesota rapidly announced the deci-
sion to their readers. The Hibbing Daily Tribune, under a headline reading "Station ordered
to accept ad," Station Ordered to Accept Ad, Hibbing Daily Tribune, Nov. 3, 1978, at 1, col.
1, reported the news. The Mesabi Daily News headline read "WKKQ ordered to accept ad
from senator." WKKQ Ordered to Accept Ad from Senator, Mesabi Daily News, Nov. 3,
1978, at 16, col. 1. Its story included the angry reaction to the decision from the station's
president, Jerry J. Collins, who said: "This is an entirely new invasion into small business
and takes away licensee discretion on programming." Id.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
country, sought to overturn it by jointly filing with WKKQ, in the
form of a legal brief, a "Petition for Reconsideration. 83 On the ac-
cess issue, it was argued that WKKQ was reasonable in refusing to
air the 5-minute ads because: 1) the 1978 Report and Order, relied
on by the majority, simply did not stand as authority for dis-
rupting a station's format or uprooting its usual commercial prac-
tices; 2) Senator Anderson was not being denied reasonable access
to the station as it had sold him ninety-six 1-minute spots during
the 4 weeks before the election; 3) the interruption of the tight mu-
sic and news format with political ads, including those from several
other candidates, was so severe that by November 6 the station was
airing 8 or 9 minutes of them an hour; and 4) considering that the
FCC required this small daytime station to leave the air by 4:30
p.m. daily, WKKQ's format was being clearly disturbed and too
frequently interrupted. The petition insisted it was reasonable for
such a broadcaster to attempt to save its audience from negatively
reacting to the listening format interruptions by refusing to sell
more political ad clutter."
With respect to the eighty dollar rate question, the petition
excoriated the Commission for extending itself into broadcast rate
regulation. The petition declared that unquestionably and despite
its own protests to the contrary, the FCC majority had in fact set
the WKKQ 5-minute rate as one to be directly proportional to its
1-minute rate. The broadcasters protested that any rate fixing was
plainly beyond the Commission's statutory authority.85
The petition expressed incredulity that the majority had re-
Petition for Reconsideration filed by WKKQ, Inc. and Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters,
Sen. Wendell Anderson (filed Dec. 4, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Petition for Reconsidera-
tion]. A petition for reconsideration, authorized by the Commission's rules, accords ag-
grieved parties an opportunity to urge the Commission to reconsider the case and reverse the
result. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.106, .429(a) (1977). A party seeking reversal of an FCC decision must
first exhaust this Commission-level administrative appeals process before petitioning for ju-
dicial invalidation of the order in the United States Court of Appeals. The petition must cite
findings of fact and conclusions of law which the petitioner deems erroneous, state the form
of relief sought, and be filed within 30 days from the date of the release of the decision or
public notice announcing the action in question. Id. §§ 1.106(d)(1), (f), .429(c), (d); see note
23 supra.
" Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 83. Senator Anderson originally requested 24
5-minute ads over an 8 day period. Had those been sold, his opponent could have demanded
24 similar 5-minute ads under the FCC's equal opportunites/equal time rule. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 315(a) (1976). The petition submitted that airing 24 or 48 5-minute ads over 8 days would
have grossly disrupted the station's regular programming. Petition for Reconsideration,
supra note 83 at 13.
" Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 83.
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fused to recognize the factors submitted by WKKQ as justification
for its rate. It was noted that the station justified a charge thirteen
times the 1-minute rate, explaining its audience loss due to format
disruption and the alienation of business sponsors who would not
be able to purchase similar 5-minute ads. By comparing the
relatively inobtrusive 1-minute spot to the disruptive potential of
a 5-minute ad for rate purposes, contended the petition "[t]he
Commission compared apples with oranges-and came away with
prunes."86
VII. DISCUSSION
A. The Access Issue-Ordering the Sale of the 5-Minute Ads
1. Analysis of Policy Precedent
In first focusing on the access decision ordering the station to
sell the 5-minute ads, an analysis of the Commission's policy state-
ments specifically listed and relied upon by the majority reveals
the true character and reliability of this precedent.
The majority regarded the result reached as fully consistent
with and required by past Commission policy statements interpret-
ing sections 312 and 315. The best that can be said of Commission
policy precedent in this area, however, is that it is inconsistent.
The worst to be said is that the Commission has vascillated,
changed directions, reversed itself often, blown hot and cold, and
bent like a frail reed subject to only the changing winds that each
successive, changeable majority of the Commissioners brings to the
decisionmaking. It is also impossible for this decision to be man-
U Id. The National Radio Broadcasters Association (NRBA), representing 1,200 radio
stations in the country, also filed a Petition for Reconsideration in this case. Petition for
Reconsideration filed by the National Radio Broadcasters Association, Sen. Wendell Ander-
son (filed Dec. 4, 1978).
Mr. D. J. Leary, Senator Anderson's campaign media consultant who originally filed the
WKKQ complaint with the FCC, filed an opposition to the broadcasters' petitions for recon-
sideration. Opposition To Petition For Reconsideration, Sen. Wendell Anderson (filed Jan.
16, 1979). The Leary petition maintained the essence of the case was that past Commission
policy statements had imposed a reasonable access obligation on broadcasters to accept 5-
minute political ads, that WKKQ had wrongly refused to do so, and had ipso facto properly
been ordered to comply by the majority's decision.
Mr. Leary submitted that the ultimate test for reconsideration should be the question
whether WKKQ in reality suffered the negative consequences it predicted would befall it if
the FCC ordered the 5-minute ads. Those included audience dissatisfaction with the inter-
ruptions and alienation of its regular business sponsors. The Leary Petition argued that
WKKQ had not submitted "one scintilla of evidence" that it suffered those consequences,
id. at 5, and that it apparently therefore did not suffer adverse consequences.
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dated by precedent when that precedent has stood for so many dif-
ferent, mutually exclusive propositions over the years, although,
unquestionably, FCC policy precedent could have been used as au-
thority for any result the majority chose-whether that be ordering
the sale of the 5-minute ads or not ordering such sale.
a. The 1978 Report and Order
The 1978 Report and Order, 87 as referenced by the majority,
states that reasonable access requires program-length ads during
prime-time hours" and that a candidate's inedia decisions should
be honored. 9 These provisions do stand as authority for the major-
ity's conclusion. Yet, there are provisions in the Report and Order
that stand as precedent for a decision affirming the station's refusal
to sell the 5-minute ads. Or, at the very least, these conflicting pro-
visions serve to dilute the provisions relied upon by the majority
and thereby confuse and mislead a typical licensee as to which of
its practices meet the obligations of sections 312 and 315 and which
do not.
The Report and Order declares that commercial licensees are
not required to "disrupt their programming schedules by offering
candidates lengths of program time which are not a normal compo-
nent of their broadcast day."" Read by a station which offers no
program-length ads to business advertisers, the language arguably
gives full assurance that the station will not be required to carve
out 5-minute political ads if 5-minute ad blocks are not normally a
component of its broadcast day.
This policy report also explains that licensees cannot ban ac-
cess to lengths they sell to commercial advertisers.' WKKQ could
have legitimately relied on this provision and concluded that it
would not be violating section 312 by refusing Senator Anderson's
request, because such refusal would not constitute banning access
to a political candidate a length of ad time sold to commercial ad-
"7 1978 Report and Order, supra note 12.
Id. at 33,770. The Commission states that "[e]xcept for prime time, this does not
necessarily mean that a licensee must always allow a candidate access to every class and
length of time." Id.
99 Id.
" Id. at 33,771. This provision was intended to place candidates in a position equal to
commercial advertisers. That is, if certain lengths of time are not offered to anyone, there is
no discrimination against a candidate and in favor of a commercial advertiser.
91 Id. at 33,770, 33,772. If certain time segments and viewing' or listening hours are avail-
able to commercial advertisers, they also must be available to political candidates. See
Summa Corp., 43 F.C.C.2d 602 (1973).
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vertisers, as no 5-minute ads were sold to commercial advertisers.
The Report and Order does not entitle a candidate to particu-
lar placement of his or her ads: "[A] licensee might reasonably re-
fuse broadcast time to political candidates during certain parts of
the broadcast day. It is best left to the discretion of the licensee
when and on what date a candidate's spot announcement or pro-
gram should be aired. 92 Arguably, if a licensee has the discretion
to protect its format by deciding when a political ad can run, there
is a corollary power to protect its format by deciding not to air a
series of lengthy political ads.
The report also declares that the section 312 right of access is
not absolute, that political broadcasts may not monopolize the air-
waves, that other programs should be aired to satisfy the needs and
interests of the listening audience, and that the best way to ac-
commodate both is to rely on the reasonable, good faith discretion
of the licensee to program its own broadcast day." This part of the
report indicates a station need not succumb to excessive demands
for political ad time, which WKKQ deemed twenty-four or forty-
eight 5-minute ads during an 8-day period on its short daylight-
only operating day. WKKQ's accommodation of Senator Anderson's
demand by providing ninety-six 1-minute spots and refusing any
longer ads to protect its listening format seems the type of fair bal-
ancing decision this Report and Order leaves to the station. 4
The report even limits its application by explaining that it
does not stand as authority for disrupting a station's format: "We
do not believe that this policy will in any way disrupt a station's
broadcast schedule. It only requires that a licensee follow its usual
commercial practices. 9 5 This assurance, it could be argued,
squarely places the Commission's imprimatur, on WKKQ's refusal
to deviate from its usual commercial practice and disrupt its
schedule by selling the 5-minute ads to Senator Anderson.
'3 1978 Report and Order, supra note 12, at 33,771 (footnotes omitted). This is part of
the policy which leaves to the broadcaster's discretion such items as programming and
scheduling.
" Id. at 33,770.
94 The Commission usually leaves to the licensee the balancing of interests which com-
pete for air time. See National Broadcasting Co., 47 F.C.C.2d 803, 811 (1974); Reasonable
Access, supra note 4.
11 1978 Report and Order, supra note 12, at 33,770.
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b. 1974 Public Notice
The 1974 Public Notice,98 relied upon by the majority, states it
would be unreasonable for stations to refuse to sell program-length
time to candidates during prime time because that would deny
them access to the greatest audiences. 7 Further, it explains that
the purpose of FECA amendments was to allow federal candidates
maximum opportunity to explain their political positions and
thereby fully inform the voters." Like the Report and Order, how-
ever, there are provisions in the 1974 Public Notice that would con-
fuse and mislead a typical licensee because they support the sta-
tion's denial of access or dilute provisions relied on by the majority.
Specifically, the notice states that licensees cannot deny candi-
dates ads of the lengths available to commercial business advertis-
ers.99 Arguably, then, if no 5-minute~ads were available to commer-
cial business advertisers, none need be offered to candidates.
The 1974 Public Notice also emphasizes that under certain cir-
cumstances a station need not comply with the general require-
ment of selling program-length ads to political candidates. Circum-
stances noted include coverage of the campaign on newscasts, the
sale of spot announcements to the candidate, and the possibility of
several candidates running and demanding so much time that the
station could properly refuse some of the demands.' 0 Similar coun-
tervailing circumstances were extant at the time WKKQ refused to
sell the 5-minute ads. The station had agreed to sell Senator An-
derson an extensive number of spot announcements. There was
also concern that his twenty-four 5-minute ads and a demand for
twenty-four more lengthy ads from his opponent would innundate
the few hours a day the station was on the air. Logically enough,
WKKQ saw itself well within this exception to the general rule and
therefore thought it was justifiable to have regarded this provision
as an affirmation of its 5-minute political ad ban and not as a re-
quirement for it to sell the ads.
This advisory explains that the access obligations imposed on
" 1974 Public Notice, supra note 49.
17 Id. at 517.
" Id.; see note 10 supra.
" 1974 Public Notice, supra note 49, at 518.
'' Id. at 517. The Commission has expressed concern over a possible inundation of the
airwaves with political campaign messages in the days immediately prior to the election.
Furthermore, a multiplicity of candidates has repeatedly been viewed by the Commission as
a countervailing circumstance which mitigates the right of candidates of access to the air.
See, e.g., Honorable Pete Flaherty, 48 F.C.C.2d 838, 848 (1974); note 127 infra.
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stations include the opportunity for candidates to purchase reason-
able amounts of time and that the test for determining whether
these obligations are met is one of reasonableness; a station acts
reasonably when it expands the exposure of a candidate and ac-
cords him access via its airwaves to the voters. 0 Underlining these
duties was the expressed assurance that each licensee was entitled
to exercise some discretion in meeting its access obligations., °" It
was arguably rational for WKKQ to have concluded that it abun-
dantly afforded Senator Anderson access to the voters by selling
him ninety-six spot ads and was within its discretion to decide how
its facilities would be used for such access purposes.
c. 1978 Political Primer
The 1978 Political Primer,0 3 relied upon by the majority,
states that "it is no excuse to claim that a station's program format
prevents it from carrying anything longer than spot announcements
by candidates.""'' Further, it sets forth the proposition that "a sta-
tion that normally broadcasts only music and spot announcements
will not be meeting its obligations if it refuses to accept or schedule
any political discussion running longer than one minute."'' 5 While
these provisions stand as authority for the majority's decision, once
again, there are provisions in this primer that stand as precedent
for a decision affirming the station's refusal to sell the 5-minute
ads. For instance, the primer emphasizes: "Commercial stations
must always make prime-time spot announcements available. '0 8
The inescapable corollary remains that stations must not always
make prime-time program-length announcements available.
Like the Report and Order and 1974 Public Notice, this advi-
sory to candidates and broadcasters notes that "[s]tations may not
adopt a policy of rejecting requests of Federal candidates of types,
lengths and classes of time that they normally sell to commercial
advertisers."'0 7
Implicit in the language of this provision is the idea that a
station may adopt a 5-minute political ad ban policy if it did not
"1 1974 Public Notice, supra note 49, at 517.
102 Id.
"I Political Primer, supra note 35.
11 Id. at 36,349.
'1 Id. at 36,382-83 (emphasis in original).
"I' Id. at 36,349.
107 Id.
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normally sell 5-minute ads to commercial advertisers.
The primer declares that the definition of reasonable access
"will depend on the circumstances of each case." ' 8 Later, it is ad-
mitted that reasonable access for station A "cannot be defined ex-
actly, however, because what is reasonable for station A may not
be reasonable for station B."'111 It could be argued that this lan-
guage negates any universal application of general reasonable ac-
cess provisions, including the one that stations cannot use their for-
mats as reasons for refusing to air 5-minute political ads.
The primer also restates:
Important as an informed electorate is to our society, there are
other elements in the public interest standard, and the public is
entitled to other kinds of programming than political . . .. The
Commission will not substitute its judgment for that of the licen-
see, but, rather, it will determine in any case that may arise
whether the licensee can be said to have acted reasonably and in
good faith in fulfilling its obligations under this section."10
This language affirms the rule that it is within a station's own
judgment as to how it will continue to provide the listening public
with the regular programming format it desires and respond to a
candidate's request for political ad time. The unmistakable con-
comitant of this is that the FCC will defer to the station's judg-
ment if reasonable and made in good faith. WKKQ was well within
precedential bounds to assume its reasonableness and good faith
would be shown by allowing Senator Anderson extensive access in
selling him nearly 100 spot announcements, not treating him differ-
ently than any other candidate or any other business sponsor, and
assessing its local audience and commercial advertisers and con-
cluding the 5-minute ad would indeed have negative consequences.
Once it went through such a good faith effort, WKKQ arguably
could have assumed that the Commission would have deferred to
its response to the Anderson request, rather than the Commission
substituting its own judgment.
d. 1968 Public Notice
The brief 1968 Public Notice,"' referenced by the majority,
30 Id.
log Id. at 36,383.
110 Id. (quoting Use of Broadcast & Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office,
34 F.C.C.2d 510, 536 (1972)).
" 1968 Public Notice, supra note 47.
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alerts licensees "to the desirability of making their facilities effec-
tively available to candidates for political office even though this
may require modification of normal station format."112 The one-
page notice, though, issued late in the 1968 campaign, was
prompted by the Commission's receipt of "information indicating
that some licensees have policies proscribing or severely limiting
political broadcasts over their facilities."" 3 The notice concluded
that "the presentation of political broadcasts, while only one of
many elements of service to the public . . . is an important facet,
deserving the licensee's closest attention."14
The Public Notice, however, is not authority for the WKKQ
decision. First, this weakly-worded notice does not even require
licensees to sell any ad time to candidates.15 Second, the notice
only expresses disapproval of stations' policies that either prohibit
political broadcasts or severely limit them."' WKKQ's policy did
neither. It allowed political broadcasts, and no one could sensibly
argue that selling ninety-six spots to one candidate alone was limit-
ing the broadcast of political messages or discussion. Third, the re-
peated thrust of the notice is that political broadcasts should be
considered and aired as a part of the public-interest programming
licensees are expected to air."' The notice does not go beyond that
statement. WKKQ's political broadcast policy clearly met and ex-
ceeded that expectation.
2. Analysis of Case Precedent
It is readily apparent that precedent could have been gleaned
from the Commission's four major political broadcasting policy
statements for any result the majority chose in this case. It is
equally clear that past Commission case decisions, in which the
FCC has adjudicated political broadcasting issues as they have ap-
peared in actual, specific contexts, constitute precedent for only
one conclusion: given the facts of this case, WKKQ should not
have been forced to sell a 5-minute ad to Senator Anderson. In
three important cases since 1972, the FCC has ruled that a sta-
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
,"5 There is not one word in the notice requiring or even encouraging the sale of specific
lengths of ads to candidates - neither 1-minute spots nor 5-minute segments.
I'8 Id.
117 Id.
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tion's denial of political ad time violated either section 312 or
315.118 Each is distinguishable from WKKQ in that the three
stations treated political advertisers differently than commercial
advertisers. Of greater importance are six other cases in which
the Commission ruled that stations' policies preventing candidates
from purchasing specific blocks of time violated neither the rea-
sonable access nor lowest unit cost provisions. "9
In Campaign '76 Media Communications, Inc.,120 then-Presi-
dent Ford sought to buy 1-minute spot ads on WGN-TV and WGN
Radio in Chicago in 1976. The stations refused, citing their policy
of not selling political ads less than 5 minutes in length. Appealing
to the FCC, the candidate argued that his political access rights
had been violated. The Commission ordered the stations to sell the
1-minute ads, basing its decision on two violations of the Commu-
nications Act.' 2' It was felt that the station policy denied President
Ford reasonable access as mandated by section 312 because it
forced him to buy the more expensive 5-minute ads 22 in order to
reach the electorate. The order also concluded that the policy vio-
lated the lowest unit charge provision of section 315(b) because, by
allowing commercial advertisers 1-minute spots, candidates were
not placed on a par with the business sponsors.'2
" See notes 120-132 and accompanying text infra.
"' See notes 134-169 and accompanying text infra.
118 58 F.C.C.2d 1142 (1976).
121 Id. at 1144-45. In the plurality ruling, Commissioners Wiley and Robinson dissented
and Commissioners Reid and Washburn concurred solely on § 315(b)(1) grounds. Therefore,
the ruling cannot be read to find that the ban on spot ads was a denial of reasonable access
pursuant to § 312(a)(7). On the contrary, a majority of the Commission believed that the
ban violated the "parity" rule of § 315(b).
2 Campaign '76 and WGN-TV disagreed about the relative costs of 5-minute ads ver-
sus spot ads. Id. at 1144. Without addressing this issue in its rationale, the FCC stated that
the refusal to allow spots ads curtails the campaign so drastically that the purposes of §
312(a)(7) would be defeated by such a practice. Id.
"I Id. at 1144-45. Commissioners Lee, Hooks and Quello found that the refusal to afford
political advertisers the same opportunities to purchase spots that were afforded regularly to
other advertisers was contrary to Congress' intent in enacting the "reasonable access" provi-
sion. Id. In his dissent, however, Commissioner Robinson disagreed bluntly: "Nothing in the
plain meaning of this provision's language, and nothing in its legislative history, compels the
conclusion that a distinction between commercial and political advertisers for purposes of
selling time is beyond the reasonable discretion of a broadcast licensee." Id. at 1145 (Robin-
son, Comm'r, dissenting). The Campaign '76 ruling has been limited by the FCC in Anthony
Martin-Trigona, 64 F.C.C.2d 1087, 1091 (1977), where the Commission declared in a plural-
ity opinion that no right of access to particular units of time arises from the "lowest unit
charge" provision of § 315(b). Id.; see note 134 infra. Previously, the FCC had foreclosed the
possibility of there being a right of access to particular units of time based on § 312(a)(7).
See, e.g., Honorable Donald W. Riegle, 59 F.C.C.2d 1314, 1315 (1976). Consequently, while a
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The FCC also found a violation of the FECA in Summa
Corp. 2 In Summa Corp., a candidate running in the 1972 Nevada
congressional primary election was denied his request to purchase
5-minute political ads by a Las Vegas television station. 25 The sta-
tion had adopted a policy of selling no political ad time during the
day in excess of 1-minute spots. The Commission ruled that such a
refusal violated section 312(a)(7) and that the station could not,
absent certain cir6umstances, restrict candidates to 1-minute
spots.'12 At two separate points in the decision, the Commission
emphasized that one of the countervailing circumstances that
would justify such a 5-minute ad ban was the existence of several
candidates for office.'2
A most significant aspect of the decision in this case, as
stressed in subsequent decisions, was the Commission's refusal to
"establish [some] precise or definite standard of licensee compli-
ance with the requirements of Section 132(a)(7).'1 21 Instead, if the
licensee's charge to its best commercial customers provides the FCC and the parties with an
accurate yardstick for measuring compliance with the rate provision of § 315(b)(1), that
yardstick is unworkable for measuring the reasonableness of a licensee's conduct in granting
federal candidates access to airtime under § 312(a)(7). But see Anthony Martin-Trigona, 64
F.C.C.2d 1087, 1092 (1977) (Hooks, Comm'r, dissenting). It appears that the Commission, or
at least part of it, has changed its mind about a § 312(a)(7) basis for requiring particular
length ads. See Senator Wendell Anderson, 69 F.C.C.2d 1270 (1978).
"1 43 F.C.C.2d 602 (1973).
1z Id. at 602. In Summa, one of eight Congressional candidates filed a complaint
against a television station based on the station's policy of banning all political ads in excess
of 60 seconds between 6 a.m. and 1:30 a.m. Id.
' Id. at 605. Based on its interpretation of Congress' intent in enacting § 312(a)(7), the
FCC stated that a complete ban on program-length ads is unreasonable in the absence of
countervailing circumstances. Id.; see 1974 Public Notice, supra note 49.
1" 43 F.C.C.2d at 605 & n.1. Two such countervailing circumstances justifying a ban on
program-length ads were enumerated by the Commission: a multiplicity of candidates and a
licensee's providing free advertising time to candidates. In this case, the FCC did not con-
sider eight candidates to be a "multiplicity" so as to justify the ban.
In a unique situation brought on by the election of Senator Walter Mondale to the Vice-
Presidency and the death of Senator Hubert Humphrey, Minnesotans in 1978 were electing
two United States Senators. There were four men running for two Senate seats in the general
election and several more in the primaries. Together with the large number of local, county,
and state candidates running in the multi-county service area of WKKQ, there unquestiona-
bly existed a unique multiplicity of candidates in Minnesota in 1978, precisely fitting the
exception established in Summa. See Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, No. 79-750
slip op. at 18-20 (F.C.C. Nov. 21, 1979), afl'd on reconsideration and petition for stay denied,
No. 79-773 (F.C.C. Nov. 28, 1979), discussed in note 132 infra.
The WKKQ ruling is also distinguishable from Summa on another point, since the tele-
vision station in Summa allowed commercial advertisers to purchase day-time 5-minute ads
and was thus treating political candidates differently than its business sponsors. See note
123 supra.
M 43 F.C.C.2d at 604; accord, Honorable Pete Flaherty, 48 F.C.C.2d 838, 848 (1974);
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licensee's judgment represented "a reasonable, good-faith attempt
to accommodate both the .. . [candidate and the listeners' inter-
ests in the regular format], this Commission will be disposed to
affirm such judgments and policies as reasonably fulfilling the obli-
gations of a licensee under Section 312(a)(7).' 121
The Commission's position was further explained in Holden E.
Sanders,"' wherein a Tennessee radio station refused to sell a local
candidate fixed position spot ads, even though the station's regular
business advertisers were allowed to purchase such ads. The candi-
date protested to the FCC, alleging that the disparate treatment
violated his political broadcast rights.13' The Commission ruled
that it was "contrary to the Congressional objective . . .to deny
such candidates the opportunity to purchase spot announcements
of the type and length which are available to commercial
advertisers." 32
Senator James L. Buckley, 63 F.C.C.2d 952, 954-55 (1976). In refusing to enunciate definite
norms for compliance with § 312(a)(7), the FCC is consistent with the language of the stat-
ute and with the intent of Congress. As the Flaherty decision points out, "[t]he statutory
language speaks in terms of 'reasonable access' and 'reasonable amounts of time,' rather
than in any absolute terms." 48 F.C.C.2d at 848 (emphasis in original).
"1 43 F.C.C.2d at 604. The Commission has consistently applied the dual test of reason-
ableness and good-faith, refusing to interfere with the editorial judgment of the licensee
where neither bad faith nor unreasonableness can be shown by the complainant. E.g., Dr.
Benjamin Spock, 44 F.C.C.2d 12, 18 (1973); Penny Manes, 42 F.C.C.2d 878, 881 (1973).
Similar tests are used to evaluate access to non-federal candidates. E.g., Anthony Martin-
Trigona, 64 F.C.C.2d 1087, 1090 (1977); Rockefeller for Governor Campaign, 59 F.C.C.2d
649, 650 (1976). It is widely understood that the basis of FCC review of licensee discretion
is narrow. See notes 175-199 and accompanying text infra.
130 52 F.C.C.2d 592 (1975). The licensee refused to sell the complainant spot time on any
but a run-of-schedule basis. Id. at 592. Naturally, this type of ad is not as valuable for a
candidate who would prefer his ad be aired at a time when the maximum numbers of view-
ers or listeners would be exposed to it.
"I' Id. at 593. The station made all four types of spot ads available to commercial adver-
tisers: (1) fixed position spots; (2) preemptible spots; (3) run-of-schedule spots; and (4) spe-
cial rate packages. For the FCC description of each, see Use of Broadcast and Cablecast
Facilities by Candidates for Public Office (Q. & A. VI.1), 34 F.C.C.2d 510, 524 (1972).
132 52 F.C.C.2d at 593-94.
In Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, No. 79-750 (F.C.C., Nov. 21, 1979), aff'd on
reconsideration and petition for stay denied, No. 79-773 (F.C.C. Nov. 28, 1979), the Commis-
sion ruled that the ABC, CBS, and NBC television networks violated § 312(a)(7) in refusing
to sell a one-half hour prime-time spot to the Carter-Mondale Committee. The Commission
was of the opinion that the networks failed to consider the candidates' needs in determining
their reasonable access obligations. No. 79-750, slip op. at 7. Furthermore, the Commission
stated that the networks were not to substitute their judgment for that of the candidate
when determining a candidate's needs. Id. On reconsideration, the Commission affirmed
their original opinion, adding that the Commission "will provide leeway to broadcasters and
not merely attempt de novo to determine the reasonableness of their judgments under Sec-
tion 312(a)(7)." No. 79-773, slip op. at 17.
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Unlike these three cases, WKKQ treated political advertisers
as it treated commercial advertisers. WKKQ had neither denied
Senator Anderson access to 1-minute spots nor foisted upon him
the higher campaign costs of making available only lengthy ads,
one of the principal targets of the 1971 FECA amendments.133
Rather, the WKKQ case is more like those cases in which the Com-
mission has allowed stations to limit the length of ads purchased
by candidates.
In Anthony Martin-Trigona,131 for example, the request to buy
time for political ad programs of one-half hour and 1 hour in length
for a candidate was denied by local television stations. 3 5 The can-
didate, Mr. Anthony Martin-Trigona, petitioned the FCC that his
political access rights had been violated and that he should be al-
lowed to purchase program-length ads during prime time. 3 ' The
stations countered that their refusals were justified because there
were ten mayoral candidates running, they had covered Mr. Mar-
tin-Trigona's candidacy on their newscasts, and Martin-Trigona
had been offered primetime spot ads. 3 '
The FCC ruled that Mr. Martin-Trigona did not have a right
to program-length ad time during prime time.' 38 The Commission
reasoned that because the candidate had been offered prime-time,
1-minute spots, he had not been denied access to the airwaves. 3 '
The Carter-Mondale decision is also important because it decided that the reasonable
access requirements apply to networks as well as to individual broadcasters, No. 79-
750, slip op. at 10, and apply before the period immediately preceding the election specified
in § 315(b), id. at 8. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has granted
a temporary stay of the Commission's order, and their decision on the merits is pending.
BROADCASTING, Jan. 14, 1980, at 32.
"" See note 10 supra.
'u 64 F.C.C.2d 1087 (1977).
' Id. at 1087. Because the petitioner was a candidate for a non-federal office, the rea-
sonable access provision of § 312(a)(7) did not apply. While licensee discretion regarding
access of non-federal candidates is limited by the reasonableness and good faith standards,
Rosenbush Advertising Agency, 31 F.C.C.2d 782, 783 (1971), the standard for non-federal
candidates is not as strict as the standard for federal candidates, see Melbourne Noel, Jr., 66
F.C.C.2d 1063, 1064 (1976); A. SHAPMO, MEDIA AccEsS 44-46 (1976); Reasonable Access,
supra note 4, at 1302-04.
2u 64 F.C.C.2d at 1088. The candidate advanced the now-familiar argument that pro-
grams of one-half and 1 hour were necessary in order to explain his views adequately. In
addition, he put forth the "parity" argument of § 315(b). Id. at 1088-89.
" Id. at 1089.
2 Id. at 1090. Six commissioners concurred in the result that the denial of program
time was not unreasonable, but only four joined in the rationale that § 315(b) does not
demand parity between the types of program-length ads made available to commercial ad-
vertisers and those made available to political advertisers. Id. at 1087.
"3 Id. at 1090.
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As viewed in the decision, Martin-Trigona had only been denied
access to the type of ad length he considered most advantageous. " "
It was declared that to the extent the 1974 Public Notice and the
Campaign '76 Media Communications, Inc. case granted access to
5-minute lengths based on section 315(b), they were overruled.',
The decision continued that whether a station can refuse to sell 5-
minute ads to candidates "is left to a determination of reasonable-
ness under Section 312(a)(7).'1 2
The FCC maintained a similar posture in Honorable Donald
W. Riegle,4 3 wherein a candidate for the Democratic nomination
for the United States Senate from Michigan sought to purchase 5-
minute ads during prime time on a Kalamazoo television station.
The station refused, claiming ads of such length would disrupt its
format and none of its regular business advertisers could purchase
5-minute ads. "4 Instead, it offered the candidate 30-minute pro-
grams and 5-minute programs during non-prime time and various
spots. 4 5 Mr. Riegle appealed to the FCC, contending the station's
refusal to sell him 5-minute ads during prime time denied him the
reasonable access required by section 312(a)(7).'" Deciding that ex-
act issue, the Commission unanimously voted in the negative,4 7
holding: "There is no evidence to suggest that through the passage
of the reasonable access provision the licensee is now required to
sell [specific lengths of time for political ads]."'4
"I Id. at 1089. Consonant with past decisions, the Commission was unwilling to find a
licensee to have denied reasonable access where it allowed a candidate some prime-time
spots and non-prime-time program-length ads, although not of the duration or in the place-
ment the candidate considered most desirable. Despite Commissioner Hooks' biting dissent,
see id. at 1092 (Hooks, Comm'r, dissenting), the Commission did not subrogate a candi-
date's right to conduct his campaign to the whim of a licensee. Allowing the candidate to
specify how and when his political programming is to be aired would lead inevitably to the
same type of private control of the airwaves and infringement of the licensee's first amend-
ment rights that the Supreme Court has tried to prevent. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969).
"' 64 F.C.C.2d at 1091.
42 Id. at 1090.
"1 59 F.C.C.2d 1314 (1976).
'" Id. at 1314-15.
"' Id. at 1315.
I" d.
"4 Commissioner Robinson was not present.
"' Id. The Commission initially concluded that the amounts of time and types of ads
the licensee offered Mr. Riegle were sufficient to satisfy § 312(a)(7). It then turned to the
question whether the refusal to air a specific length ad at a particular part of the day vio-
lated § 312(a)(7). Id. Relying on the pre-section 315 ruling in Humphrey for President Cam-
paign, 34 F.C.C.2d 471 (1972), the FCC refused to alter its longstanding view that the candi-
[Vol. 54:279
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The Commission's position remained consistent in WALB-TV,
Inc.,' 4 when Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter attempted to
purchase a 5-hour block of time on an Albany, Georgia, TV station
to air a fund-raising telethon. The station refused, citing its policy
of not accepting programs in excess of 30 minutes and arguing that,
in its judgment, 5 hours of time was simply too much to sell one
political candidate.'50 A petition filed with the FCC contended the
station's refusal violated the reasonable access provisions of section
312.
The Commission denied the petition, ruling that although the
licensee denied Mr. Carter access to its air for a particular length
of time he sought on this occasion, that "alone does not establish a
violation of Section 312(a)(7). ' '' 51 The FCC noted that the candi-
date had otherwise been accorded access in blocks of time-both
spots and 30-minute segments-considered appropriate by the
station and that reasonable access therefore had been provided.'512
The thrust of the decision was that reasonable access did not in-
clude unlimited access on demand to particular lengths of political
ad time.' 3
In a similar decision, Don C. Smith,'54 a Kansas Congressional
candidate attempted to buy a half-hour segment during mid-prime
date's right of access to reasonable amounts of time does not include the right to a specific
length of time during a particular time of the day. On this basis, a ban on 5-minute, prime-
time ads was found not to be a denial of reasonable access. 59 F.C.C.2d at 1316.
"' 59 F.C.C.2d 1246 (1976).
" Id. at 1247.
,5, Id. at 1248.
152 Id.
'l The Commission weighed the seriousness of the station's single refusal in light of the
free and paid program time and paid spots made available to the petitioner. Id. This balanc-
ing process was subsequently described by the FCC:
iTihe Commission looks to the facts of the situation, the classes, lengths and
times being offered to the candidate and the scheduling commitments of the sta-
tion, including those to other political candidates, to determine whether the access
offered to the candidates can be said to have been reasonable in light of those
facts.
Honorable Donald W. Riegle, 59 F.C.C.2d 1314, 1315 (1976). Using this approach, the Com-
mission has found one 30-minute program and one 5- or 6 /2-minute program "in a major
senatorial race" to violate § 312(a)(7), Senator James L. Buckley, 63 F.C.C.2d 952, 954-55
(1976), but not a complete ban on political advertising during a 3-day radiothon for a char-
ity, RKO General, Inc., 61 F.C.C.2d 1183, 1185 (1976).
51 49 F.C.C.2d 678 (1974). The complainant asserted that the licensee's refusal to air his
2 hour program on a weekday during prime-time denied him reasonable access. Prior to the
filing of the complaint, the licensees offered- to air the program on a specific Sunday at 6
p.m. By the time the Commission had issued its ruling, the complainant had accepted that
offer.
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time from four radio and television stations. When the licensees
refused and offered only shorter 5-minute segments, the candidate
petitioned the FCC that the stations' policies violated section 312.
The Commission upheld the licensees' refusals and stressed that
candidates enjoyed no right to purchase "program time of any par-
ticular or minimum duration." '155 The decision also emphasized
that a candidate has no right to demand placement of his ad at a
specific time of the broadcast day, that the FCC defers to licensee
discretion in this area, that the FCC does not intend to substitute
its judgment for that of the licensee, 5 ' and that the reasonable ac-
cess requirement of section 312 is one of general, total amounts of
time afforded a candidate and not absolute, specific, particular
lengths of ads.'57
The Commission also declined to order the sale of political ad
time in Honorable Pete Flaherty.' There, a 1974 candidate for the
United States Senate from Pennsylvania attempted to purchase a
5-minute block of political ad time for a telethon from fifteen
Pennsylvania television stations. When the stations refused, the
candidate, Mayor Pete Flaherty of Pittsburgh, filed a complaint
with the FCC alleging the refusals violated section 312(a)(7) and
the 1974 Public Notice of the Commission interpreting it. Flaherty
explained that there was not a multiplicity of candidates and
" Id. at 680 (quoting Honorable Pete Flaherty, 48 F.C.C.2d 838, 848 (1974)). The Com-
mission interpreted the complaint not as one for refusal to give reasonable amounts of time,
but as one for refusal to schedule program time during the part of prime time which the
candidate considered most advantageous. Id. at 680. When the facts are viewed in this light,
Flaherty's language that a candidate is not entitled to any particular scheduling or mix of
time applies directly. Sensitive to first amendment problems that would arise were it to
specify how access is to be scheduled and programmed, the FCC continues to avoid setting
up norms, despite the requests of candidates. See, e.g., Anthony Martin-Trigona, 64
F.C.C.2d 1087, 1090 (1977); Senator James L. Buckley, 63 F.C.C.2d 952, 954-55 (1976);
Honorable Donald W. Riegle, 59 F.C.C.2d 1314, 1315 (1976). The WKKQ rationale, how-
ever, erodes that position somewhat.
1' 49 F.C.C.2d at 680. Placement of an ad is initially the province of the licensee. In
fact, however, compliance with the reasonable access requirement is the product of candi-
date/licensee negotiation after a series of offers and counter-offers. See Reasonable Access,
supra note 4, at 1293-94.
" 49 F.C.C.2d at 680. A single refusal of a candidate's requested advertising time alone
does not constitute a violation of § 312(a)(7). Instead, in evaluating a complaint, the Com-
mission usually will look at how the licensee is fulfilling the reasonable access requirement
and its other affirmative obligations as a "public trustee." See id.; Rockefeller for Governor
Campaign, 59 F.C.C.2d 649, 650 (1976). But see Senator Wendell Anderson, 69 F.C.C.2d
1265 (1978)(FCC seemingly ignores over-all performances of licensee in declaring single
denial of access unreasonable).
153 48 F.C.C.2d 838 (1974).
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therefore the Summa exception was inapplicable'59 and argued that
he needed the longer time blocks to discuss issues that could not be
covered in spot announcements.'10 The stations vigorously pro-
tested, contending that their format would be disrupted.','
The Commission denied the Flaherty complaint, holding the
stations' refusals did not violate section 312(a)(7). 12 The FCC flatly
declared that it "declined to recognize- any right, by a Federal can-
didate, to program time of any particular or minimum duration."'' 3
The decision eased the thrust of the 1974 Public Notice by not
"prescribing any precise formula for measuring licensee perform-
ance in honoring [the right of access] so as not to interfere unneces-
sarily with licensee scheduling and program discretion."'' "- The
IsO Id. at 846; see note 127 supra; cf. Penny Manes, 42 F.C.C.2d 878, 882 (1973) (number
of races and other contests in area factors for finding station's coverage of individual race
reasonable).
"1 48 F.C.C.2d at 838-39. The 41,-hour telethon was intended to explain the candi-
date's stand on various issues and to solicit viewer support, financial and otherwise.
"I Id. at 842-47. The 10 licensees answered generally by asserting that they all provided
30-minute programs and spot announcements in prime and non-prime time in satisfaction of
§ 312(a)(7).
WTAE-TV, Pittsburgh, argued Flaherty's request would disrupt its format and that it
did not sell extended periods of time to any sponsor. Id. at 839. WHC-TV, Pittsburgh, ex-
pressed a similar format disruption argument. Id. at 843. WJAC-TV, Johnstown, explained
it was reasonable to refuse the request because it would disrupt the network movie sched-
uled to be shown at the particular time. Id. at 842.
"62 Id. at 848. Using the reasonableness test of licensees' conduct, the Commission found
that the refusal to air the telethon was not unreasonable, especially in light of the overall
time allotments the licensees had made available. In doing so, it refused to weigh the rela-
tive values of the licensees' choices of programming vis-a-vis the candidate's program
preference:
As we have here indicated, our scope of review over licensee action in this area is
narrow, and, were we to call upon licensees to justify their programming selections
or program scheduling, the matter would come down to a judgment as to what was
presented, and when, as against what should have been presented, and when - a
judgmental area for licensees exercising their sound journalistic discretion and one
which this Commission must avoid.
Id. at 849 (citation omitted); see A. SHARRO, MEDIA AccEss 43 (1976). The FCC has not
found denials of access to candidates for lengthy political telethons on radio or television to
be unreasonable, at least where the licensees had provided shorter time periods. WALB-TV,
Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1246, 1248 (1976).
"1 48 F.C.C.2d at 848. In addition, the candidate is not entitled to any particular place-
ment of program-length ads by virtue of § 312(a)(7). Id.; accord, Don C. Smith, 49 F.C.C.2d
678, 680 (1974). Nevertheless, Flaherty recognized the obligation of a licensee under §
312(a)(7) to permit access to prime-time, program-length ads, at least under the facts pecu-
liar to that situation. The exact length and amount of total time afforded, however, are still
within the realm of licensee discretion, subject to FCC review. Id. See notes 199-205 infra.
"1 48 F.C.C.2d at 848. For a discussion of the balancing of FCC regulation with licensee
first amendment protection, see notes 175-222 and accompanying text infra.
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Commission emphasized that a licensee had discretion to decide
how to accommodate political access demands, that the scope of
review employed by the FCC, given the sensitive first amendment
area, would be narrow in order to avoid debates over programming
judgment, and that the Commission shunned substituting its pro-
gramming judgment for that of the licensee. 16 5
In the final significant FCC case, Humphrey for President
Campaign,6' a Wisconsin television station followed a policy of
selling only 1-minute and 30-minute political ads. When Presiden-
tial candidate Hubert Humphrey sought to purchase a 15-minute
segment, he was refused. In his petition, Senator Humphrey in-
sisted he had a right to buy 15-minute ads and that a candidate's
decision with respect to the length of his ads should be honored by
the broadcaster." 7 The station justified its refusal on the grounds
that its regular format would be disrupted and its audience dimin-
ished. The FCC upheld the views of the licensee as reasonable
under the circumstances and ruled against Humphrey, reasoning
that the Act neither required format disruption nor sale of "specific
periods of time for political broadcasts. 168
As in Humphrey for President Campaign and Honorable Don-
ald W. Riegle, WKKQ had refused to sell the 5-minute segments to
Senator Anderson based on a concern for its listening format., 9
Furthermore, WKKQ argued, as in Honorable Pete Flaherty and
WALB-TV, Inc., that Senator Anderson had no absolute right to 5-
minute segments. 7 ' Consistent with Don C. Smith and Anthony
Martin-Trigona, WKKQ's own business judgment had been that it
would meet Senator Anderson's political needs by selling him a to-
tal of ninety-six segments but not any specific 5-minute periods.'",
It is submitted that in factual contexts quite analagous to the
16 48 F.C.C.2d at 849.
"' 34 F.C.C.2d 471 (1972).
"6 Id. at 471-72. The Humphrey campaign committee wished to exercise its right to
"equal time," see note 188 infra, by purchasing two 15-minute segments to be aired sepa-
rately. The committee claimed that it could not afford to purchase a single 30-minute seg-
ment as the other candidates had done. WITI-TV refused this request because having to
accomodate segments shorter than the usual 30-minute ones would "fractionalize" its night-
time programming. Id. at 472. Rather than letting the licensee decide the permissible length
of ads, the campaign committee urged that it should be for the candidate to determine all
aspects of his advertising needs, including length of ads. Id. at 471.
"' Id. at 472.
' See notes 143 & 166 and accompanying text supra.
"' See notes 149 & 158 and accompanying text supra.
' See notes 134-54 and accompanying text supra.
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instant case, the FCC over several years has established unwaver-
ing case precedent only for a result affirming WKKQ's policy.
3. Conclusion on Policy and Case Precedent
The inconsistencies that have been woven into this preceden-
tial crazy quilt have not gone unnoticed by at least one Commis-
sioner. In his dissent to the Martin-Trigona decision, former Com-
missioner Benjamin Hooks noted the Commission's vacillation in
interpreting sections 312 and 315:
[I]f the majority is correct, and we do continually fumble the ball
in administering political equal time, it is sure as sin (a) impossi-
ble to expect our licensees to accurately interpret Section 315...
and (b) unreasonable to expect the courts to give 'great deference'
to our 'administrative expertise' when we ourselves do not.'72
Indeed, no deference is due in the WKKQ case.
It is submitted that basing this decision on chameleon-like
policy statements which are so internally inconsistent that they
could have been used as policy precedent for any result the major-
ity chose 73 and basing it on case precedent that is unshakably in-
consistent and unexplainedly irreconcilable with the result, 74 ren-
ders it prime for reversal by the Court of Appeals.
4. The Substitution of Judgments-First Amendment Issues
The WKKQ decision is also particularly vulnerable to reversal
on first amendment grounds.17 Broadcasters unquestionably enjoy
7 64 F.C.C.2d at 1093 (Hooks, Comm'r, dissenting) (emphasis in original).
'7' See notes 87-94 and accompanying text supra.
I See notes 120-58 and accompanying text supra.
' Despite the fact that the first amendment mandates that there be "no abridgment"
of the freedoms of speech or press, these freedoms are not absolute. Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONsT1Tu-
TIONAL LAW 1049-54 (9th ed. 1975). Nevertheless, these freedoms are broad and have been
extended into areas formerly considered not deserving of constitutional protection. See, e.g.,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)(libel and commercial speech). Al-
though it combines elements of speech and press, broadcasting is regulated extensively by
the government through the FCC in ways that would be unconstitutional were they applied
to the press. Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), with
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Regulation of broadcasting has been
sustained against the challenge that it violated the licensee's first amendment rights. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943).
It is clear that a broadcaster's rights are not as extensive as a newspaper publisher's
because of the unique characteristics of broadcasting, see note 179 and accompanying text
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certain free speech and press rights, '76 but because of the unique
characteristics of broadcasting, such as radio spectrum scarcity' 77
and the pervasiveness of the electronic media,17 1 the first amend-
ment rights are diminished by the federal regulation of licensees'
programming and operation. 79
In recognition of these free speech and press rights, the federal
regulation of broadcasting has been cautious over the decades.' 0
infra, and because of a broadcaster's duties as a "public trustee." Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117-18 (1973). These limits, however,
must be reconciled with a broadcaster's wide discretion regarding editorial judgments. As
the Supreme Court declared:
Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to develop with the widest jour-
nalistic freedom consistent with its public obligations. Only when the interests of
the public are found to outweigh the private journalistic interests of the broadcast-
ers will government power be asserted within the framework of the [Communica-
tions] Act.
Id. at 110. For these reasons, FCC censorship is precluded by statute. See text accompany-
ing note 181 infra. This places the FCC in the precarious position of "overseer," regulating
protected speech without infringing on a licensee's broad discretion. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 188 (1973). Further, the FCC may not
substitute its judgment for that of the licensee. See National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
516 F.2d 1101, 1117-20 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976).
,"I United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948); accord, FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 702-03 (1979); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 386 (1969); see note 175 supra.
'17 Along with the need to avoid the chaotic situation that preceded federal regulation,
the physical limitation on the number of transmitting frequencies has been the main reason
used to justify federal regulation of broadcasting. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
'18 The pervasiveness of the electronic media is used chiefly to justify FCC regulation of
broadcasting content, particularly as it relates to restricting indecent, though non-obscene,
speech and programming for children. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-50
(1978). See generally Note, Pacifica Foundation v. FCC: "Filthy Words," the First Amend-
ment and the Broadcast Media, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 164, 168-72 (1978); Note, Morality and
the Broadcast Media: A Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory Standards, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 664, 675-86 (1971).
"' See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978). In Pacifica, the Court
bluntly stated: "[oif all forms of communications, it is broadcasting that has received the
most limited First Amendment protection." Id. at 748.
The argument that there ought to be no distinction between broadcasting and other
forms of expression traditionally protected against government interference was rejected in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969). The licensee resisted an
FCC order to allow reply time to personal attacks and political editorials by saying that he
should be able to speak or refrain from speaking without restriction in the way that an
individual citizen would be free to do. Id. at 386. The Court disagreed, enunciating the "fre-
quency-scarcity" rationale for the first time: "Where there are substantially more individu-
als who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individ-
ual to speak, write, or publish." Id. at 388.
" See, e.g., American Security Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 444-45,
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The sensitivity of the Congress to those rights is evidenced by its
adoption of section 326 of the Communications Act which provides
that "[n]othing in this [Act] shall be understood or construed to
give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio com-
munications . . .and no regulations or condition shall be promul-
gated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the
right of free speech by means of radio communication.'' 81 Since
1934, the FCC has exercised self-restraint in its regulation of
broadcasting.'8 2 This cautious, disciplined regulation has been ap-
proved by the courts.' In a landmark political broadcasting deci-
sion involving the fairness doctrine,8 4 Chief Justice Burger spoke of
447-48 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Melbourne Noel, Jr., 66 F.C.C.2d 1063, 1063 (1976).
47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976).
' E.g., Melbourne Noel, Jr., 66 F.C.C.2d 1063, 1063-64 (1976); Senator James L. Buck-
ley, 63 F.C.C.2d 952, 954-55 (1976); The American Independent Party v. ABC, 62 F.C.C.2d
4, 12 (1976); see A. SHAPIRO, MEDIA AccEss 44 (1976). But see Note, Morality and the Broad-
cast Media: A Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory Standards, 84 HARV. L. REv. 664,
665-71 (1971). The reluctance of the FCC to overstep constitutional limits is evident in its
refusal to regulate programming in response to listener's demands, even though that regula-
tion has been sanctioned by a reviewing court.
'l See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219-20 (1943); Ameri-
can Security Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 444-45 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
910 (1976).
"I Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
The fairness doctrine is the name given to two obligations imposed on licensees in their
capacity as public trustees. American Security Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d
438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In order to promote an informed electorate, broadcasters must
"devote a reasonable amount of broadcast time to the coverage of public issues," and "cover
controversial issues of public importance fairly by providing an opportunity for the presenta-
tion of contrasting points of view." The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doc-
trine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 693
(1976). The right to reply to personal attacks and editorial statements is derived from the
doctrine. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377-79 (1969). As with the rea-
sonable access requirement, the FCC must balance the competing interests and avoid sub-
stituting its judgment for the licensee's in enforcing the fairness doctrine. American Security
Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1979); The Handling of
Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Commu-
nications Act, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 697 (1976). Consequently, the choice of topics with which
to deal and the determination whether the topics are "controversial," thereby triggering the
obligation to provide contrasting views, are the licensee's in the first instance. See S. SIM-
MONS, THE FAmNEss DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA 10 (1978). Further, there is no requirement
that every controversial topic be covered or that every viewpoint on a controversy be repre-
sented. Penny Manes, 42 F.C.C.2d 878, 882 (1973). FCC review is limited to situations where
the complainant has made out a prima facie case of licensee unreasonableness or bad faith.
American Security Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 445-46 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Georgia Power Project v. FCC, 559 F.2d 237, 240 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); The Handling
of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Com-
munications Act, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 696-97 (1976). See Carter-Mondale Presidential Coin-
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the first amendment interests justifying restraint by the
government:
[T]he initial and primary responsibility for fairness, balance, and
objectivity rests with the licensee. This role of the Government as
an "overseer" and ultimate arbiter and guardian of the public in-
terest and the role of the licensee as a journalistic "free agent"
call for a delicate balancing of competing interests. The mainte-
nance of this balance for more than 40 years has called on both
the regulators and the licensees to walk a "tightrope" to preserve
the First Amendment values written into the Radio Act and its
successor, the Communications Act.'15
In this regard, the Commission has deliberately deferred to
certain judgments of its licensees when appearing reasonable.'86
This principle has been a robust tenet in the enforcement of the
two major Commission political broadcasting rules that specifically
delegate responsibility and discretion to the licensees-the fair-
ness doctrinels " and the reasonable access provision.' 8 The fairness
mittee, No. 79-750, slip op. at 12, (Nov. 21, 1979), discussed at note 132 supra. See generally
A. SHAPIRO, MEDIA AccEss 111-68 (1976).
"I Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117
(1973)(plurality opinion). The Court again expressed the tension in the roles of both licensee
and FCC. The licensee is caught between his interests as an entrepreneur and his obligations
as a public trustee who is "using" the broadcasting facilities for the 3-year licensing period.
The FCC, similarly, is caught between its role as regulator and that as preserver of licensee
discretion. Enmeshed in this conflict also is the public whose right to robust political debate
and multi-faceted presentation of information is served by both FCC and broadcaster. See
id. at 114-21; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969). In Columbia
Broadcasting, the Court balanced the competing interests by upholding the fairness doctrine
with its mandated right of reply but denying a private party the right to have access to
licensee's facilities. 412 U.S. at 121-32.
181 Georgia Power Project v. FCC, 559 F.2d 237, 239-40 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam);
American Independent Party v. American Broadcasting Co., 62 F.C.C.2d 4, 11 (1976); Penny
Manes, 42 F.C.C.2d 878, 882 (1973).
,8 See note 146 supra.
"s The other political broadcasting rules are mechanical in operation and allow for little
discretion on the part of the licensee. These include the equal opportunities/equal time pro-
vision, see 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976), requiring that equal time or opportunity be given com-
peting candidates if one candidate appears on the station; the personal-attack rules, 47
C.F.R. § 73.123(a), (b) (1978), obligating a broadcaster to notify, supply a transcript, and
offer reasonable opportunity for reply to any person or group attacked on the air; the politi-
cal editorial provision, 47 C.F.R. § 73.123(c) (1978), requiring stations which editorially en-
dorse or oppose a candidate to offer reasonable, free reply time to those candidates opposed;
and the lowest unit charge section , 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1976), mandating a broadcaster to
charge political candidates only the lowest advertising rates it charges its volume business
sponsors, see 47 C.F.R. § 73.1940(b) (1978).
The fairness doctrine is distinct from the equal opportunities doctrine. Rather than the
licensee's obligations being mandated by statute, the fairness doctrine arises from a licen-
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doctrine requires the presentation of contrasting viewpoints when
controversial issues of public importance are discussed on a pro-
gram. ' 9 The Commission has plainly detailed the areas of fairness
doctrine licensee discretion:
[T]he licensee, in applying the fairness doctrine, is called upon to
make reasonable judgments in good faith on the facts of each situ-
ation - as to whether a controversial issue of public importance
is involved, as to what viewpoints have been or should be
presented, as to the format and spokesmen to present the view-
points, and all the other facets of such programming.'
The Commission has also explained that licensees have discre-
tion to make two access judgments, if reasonable: balancing the
candidate's access demands against the interests of the listeners in
the regular programming and determining exactly how their facili-
ties will be used to accord access to qualified candidates.19" ' It has
been emphasized that the FCC will defer to good faith judgments
in this area, will not substitute its judgment for that of the licen-
see, and will only override a licensee's decision if unreasonable.'92
The principle of deference to licensee judgments is especially
vital when editorial-type decisions are involved in determining
what program will be aired. In the political broadcasting context,
this deference has been affirmed and given force by the courts.
In National Broadcasting Company v. FCC (NBC),'93 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed an
FCC fairness doctrine ruling and vigorously criticized the Commis-
sion for attempting to substitute its judgment for that of the licen-
see.'94 The licensee had broadcast a program dealing with pension
plans. Exercising the discretion given it by the Commission's policy
statements, the station concluded a controversial issue was not in-
see's duty as a public trustee and is merely given formal recognition by statute. Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369-70 (1969).
"I See note 184 supra. Most litigation surrounds three questions: whether a controver-
sial issue has been presented, whether the presentation of a controversial issue has been
one-sided, and defining the precise issue dealt with in the broadcast. See, e.g., National
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976);
Healey v. FCC, 460 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See generally S. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS
DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA 146-88 (1978).
113 Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599 (1964).
"' See note 92 supra. See generally Reasonable Access, supra note 4, at 1295-98 & n.38.
292 See notes 92, 101 & 111 supra.
193 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976).
"I Id. at 1118.
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volved and therefore the fairness doctrine was not triggered.'915 The
FCC scrutinized the program, reached the opposite conclusion, and
ordered compliance with the fairness doctrine.'96 The court of ap-
peals employed strong language in reversing the FCC:
The Commission's error of law is that it failed adequately to
apply the message of applicable decisions that the editorial judg-
ments of the licensee must not be disturbed if reasonable and in
good faith. The licensee has both initial responsibility and pri-
mary responsibility. It has wide discretion and latitude that must
be respected even though, under the same facts, the agency would
reach a contrary conclusion.'97
The court ruled that before the FCC could overrule a licensee's
fairness doctrine judgment as unreasonable, it must either have
"extrinsic evidence that the licensee's characterization 
. . . was
not made in good faith"'' 8 or bear "the burden of demonstrating
that the licensee's judgment was unreasonable to the point of
abuse of discretion [which] requires a determination that reasona-
ble men viewing the program would not have concluded that its
subject was as described by the licensee."' 99
The NBC decision is helpful in analyzing the WKKQ case for
several reasons. First, the subject matter is similar because the
fairness doctrine and reasonable access provision are comparable:
each alone constitutes one of the six main political broadcasting
rules and together comprise the only two that leave certain judg-
ments to the licensees. 2 ° The regulatory issues are also the same:
Id. at 1106-08.
Id. at 1118.
,9 Id. The decision also declared: "There may be mistakes in the licensee's determina-
tion. But the review power of the agency is limited to licensee determinations that are not
only different from those the agency would have reached in the first instance but are unrea-
sonable." Id. (footnote omitted).
198 Id. at 1121.
Id. (footnote omitted). The court concluded by admonishing the FCC and strength-
ening the principle of deference:
[There must be] a vigilant concern that a government agency is not to intervene or
burden or second-guess the journalist given primary discretion and responsibility,
unless there is documentation of unreasonableness on the part of the licensee
.... [Here] the Commission did not guide itself by the appropriate restrictive
standards.
Id. at 1133.
m Because licensees are allowed more discretion in complying with the fairness doctrine
and the reasonable access requirement than the equal opportunity and personal attack rules,
the FCC's role is more restricted in reviewing compliance with the two former provisions. Id.
at 1120; Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
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When must the Commission defer the discretion of the licensee?
When can the licensee's judgment properly be overruled?21 Fur-
ther, both cases involve editorial judgments of licensees. In each,
the licensee must decide whether the political broadcast rules re-
quire the broadcast of particular programming or advertising
material.
The significance of the NBC case is twofold. First, it sets forth
a standard for the substitution of a licensee's judgment by the
FCC.2 2 The Commission must, for one,' produce extrinsic evidence
of licensee bad faith.2 0s There was no such evidence that WKKQ's
decision-making process here could be characterized as such. The
record does, however, indicate its good faith by its treatment of
Senator Anderson on the same basis as all other candidates and
business sponsors, and its agreement to sell him nearly 100 spots
before the election.
Absent extrinsic evidence of bad faith in a fairness doctrine
case, the FCC must demonstrate, under NBC, that a reasonable
listener would have concluded that the program's subject was a
public issue.204 Applying this reasoning to the WKKQ facts, the
FCC would have to show that a reasonable listener would have
concluded that there was not reasonable access. Yet it is arguable
that the average, reasonable WKKQ listener, selecting the station
for its country and western music, upon hearing possibly ninety-six
spots for Senator Anderson in 4 weeks would have concluded that
the Senator had been fully allowed reasonable access.
Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599 (1964).
21I Great deference is due broadcasters' judgments regarding how they meet require-
ments of the fairness doctrine. The NBC court was acutely aware of the "chilling" effect
that day-to-day FCC interference with program content would cause especially in the area of
investigative journalism. 516 F.2d at 1123-25. Similarly, great deference is due broadcasters'
judgments regarding balancing a candidate's right to access with the listeners' interests in
diversified programming. Mandating that a 5-minute ad be offered by a day-time only sta-
tion, knowing that such a "use" will trigger the equal time requirement, takes the primary
discretion from the licensee and puts it in the FCC. This will frustrate Congress' intent. See
Reasonable Access, supra note 4, at 1295 n.38.
m 516 F.2d at 1117-22. NBC crystalized the circumstances under which a licensee's
judgment about the scope of issues can be violative of the fairness doctrine. The court em-
phasized that the Commission must satisfy a heavy burden in order to overturn a licensee
judgment in a discretionary area. Id. at 1121.
" Id. at 1121. Actual hostility to the candidate evidenced by discriminatory treatment
or direct testimony may be required for a showing of bad faith. See Reasonable Access,
supra note 4, at 1295 n.41.
11 516 F.2d at 1121. The court interpreted the reasonableness requirement to be met if
reasonable men viewing the program would not have concluded that its subject was as
described by the licensee." Id. (footnote omitted).
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The NBC case is also significant for its unambiguous affirma-
tion of the principle of deference to licensee discretion unless
plainly unreasonable.2 5 The proposition that the FCC cannot sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the licensee is so strong that the
court refused to allow a licensee's decision to be overruled even if it
was mistaken.2 1 Under this reasoning, even if the FCC would show
WKKQ had been mistaken in not understanding that certain
provisions of certain policy statements required it to accept 5-minute
ads, the Commission could not overrule the station's access
accommodation judgment unless it could also, by the standard
promulgated, demonstrate WKKQ had abused its discretion. Absent
the unreasonableness as determined by the standard of the NBC
case, the WKKQ decision smacks of the Commission's improperly
substituting its judgment for that of the licensee.
5. Fifth Amendment Due Process Issues
The WKKQ decision, based on the statutory mandate of rea-
sonable access as interpreted by the Commission's four major pol-
icy statements in the area, is susceptible to a constitutional due
process challenge. It could credibly be argued that the reasonable
access obligations of section 312(a)(7) fail to comport with the fifth
amendment's due process requirements with respect to definiteness
and notice.2 17 This failure is compounded by the numerous internal
inconsistencies of the FCC's interpretive policy statements. 28 The
statute at issue obligates broadcast licensees to "allow reasonable
Id. at 1113, 1115, 1118-21.
Id. at 1118. Errors of judgment are not violative of the fairness doctrine, as long as
the licensee exercised reasonable good-faith judgment in making his decision. Id.
2' The fifth amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving a person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. One way such deprivation occurs is when
a statute or standard in which a person is convicted or found liable is vague. The term
"vagueness" denotes the situation where legislation is so uncertain that men of ordinary
intelligence must guess at its meaning. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914). Because of the
law's indefiniteness, the person punished does not have fair notice of the conduct that is
proscribed. As a further consequence, vague regulations allow for discriminatory and arbi-
trary law enforcement. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168 (1972). In a
first amendment context, courts are even more sensitive to the problem of vagueness because
of the additional fact that such vagueness may chill protected speech. E.g., Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974). In an effort to comply with a vague law, a person may
refrain from exercising even protected speech because he is unsure of the parameters of the
punishable speech.
m See notes 87-117 and accompanying text supra.
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access ... by a legally qualified candidate. 2 9 The FCC's rules
enforcing the statute and its public notices interpreting it consti-
tute a regulatory flight plan for licensees that is as aerially straight
as a boomerang.20
Within the 1978 Report and Order, 211 the 1974 Public Notice, 2
and the 1978 Political Primer213 are provisions that could constitute
notice, albeit equivocal, to WKKQ of a responsibility to sell the
requested 5-minute ads .21  Yet, at the same time in those same
rules and notices are provisions that could constitute notice to
WKKQ that it would not be violating section 312 by refusing to
accept the ads.2t 5 At the very least, these conflicting provisions
must be characterized as confusing and misleading. The provisions
of the 1968 Public Notice, it is noted, contain no notice of any re-
sponsibility of WKKQ to sell a 5-minute political ad.216 At issue
here is a terse statute which speaks only generally of reasonable-
ness and authorized agency rules and orders that equivocate, fluc-
tuate, and shift.
The argument could be raised that neither the statute nor the
Commission's interpretations of it were sufficiently definite to pro-
vide WKKQ with notice that it would violate section 312(a)(7) by
refusing the ads in question. The proposition is well-settled that a
statute which lacks sufficient definiteness is unconstitutional for
" 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976).
211 See notes 87-117 supra. The paramount problem is the conflict whether a licensee
must afford program-length ads even if he reasonably decides that they are format-disrup-
tive. While some language in both Summa Corp. and Campaign '76 may be read to require
licensees to offer program-length ads, they do not state this squarely and unequivocally.
Further, while both of those rulings invalidated a ban on certain length ads, there were
extenuating circumstances that were absent from WKKQ which could lead WKKQ reasona-
bly to believe that its ban was lawful. First, both weighed the total amount of time made
available to the complainant in finding the denial to be unreasonable. Second, the television
station in Summa Corp. had offered commercial advertisers the length of ads they denied to
the candidate. Because neither of these factors were present in WKKQ, the licensee was
reasonable in making the judgment it did. The policy statements did not clear up the di-
lemma the licensee faced. Instead, they further muddied the water. See notes 87-117 and
accompanying text supra.
'" 1978 Report and Order, supra note 12.
:12 1974 Public Notice, supra note 49.
21 1978 Political Primer, supra note 35.
224 The 1974 Public Notice, for example, stated that a licensee was obligated to sell
program-length time to candidates pursuant to § 312(a)(7). 1974 Public Notice, supra note 49,
at 518. In spite of this, the 1978 Report and Order suggested that in some instances licensees
need not sell program time if doing so would disrupt normal scheduling or commercial prac-
tices. 1978 Report and Order, supra note 49, at 36, 382-83.
2,5 See notes 87-123 and accompanying text supra.
M1 See notes 113 & 114 and accompanying text supra.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
vagueness." 7 The Supreme Court early ruled that "a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, violate[d] the first essential of due
process of law."' 8 Here, it could be asserted that the statute and
interpretations were so vague that the WKKQ management, al-
though knowledgable in communications, was forced to guess
whether it was obligated by law to sell the ads. Further, a rather
cogent contention might include the point that licensees certainly
must be said to differ about the statute's application because even
the FCC, as the expert administrative agency charged with na-
tional broadcast regulation, has issued differing, inconsistent inter-
pretations of it.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that the standard of
definiteness for a civil statute is "whether the language conveys
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practices. 219 With re-
spect to the instant case, WKKQ could protest that the common
understanding and practice of the broadcast industry, as evidenced
by licensee conduct in the FCC cases, was that section 312 did not
require licensees to sell particular lengths of ads to political candi-
dates that were disruptive of format and not available to business
sponsors. Of course, with reference to those very cases, arguably
the Commission itself greatly contributed to such an industry un-
derstanding by not requiring, the sale of specific length ads in nu-
merous contexts.20 It could vigorously be maintained that, when
measured by industry practice and understanding, the language of
section 312 requiring reasonableness did not convey warning to
2,7 See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Connally v. Gen-
eral Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S.
216, 221 (1914).
211 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
"I Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951) (citation omitted). Jordan scruti-
nized a civil immigration statute and held that the phrase "crime involving moral turpi-
tude" was sufficiently definite. Id. The Court reasoned that because of the long history of the
use of the term without confusion by the courts, its meaning had become precise enough to
warn individuals of the consequences of certain conduct. Id. at 227-28.
2 See Anthony Martin-Trigona, 64 F.C.C.2d 1087 (1977) (ban on ads in excess of 5
minutes upheld); WALB-TV, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1246 (1976) (ban on all ads over 30 minutes
upheld); Honorable Donald W. Riegle, 59 F.C.C.2d 1314 (1976) (ban on 5-minute prime-time
ads upheld); Honorable Pete Flaherty, 48 F.C.C.2d 838 (1974) (ban on all ads but spots and
30-minute programs upheld); Humphrey for President Campaign, 34 F.C.C.2d 471 (1972)
(ban on all ads but spots and 30-minute programs upheld).
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WKKQ that it would violate the statute by refusing the ads."2 '
The severity of the penalty for violation of a civil statute will
justify the Court's scrutiny for vagueness.2 Likewise, the penalty
for violation of section 312 is severe-revocation of the broad-
caster's license to operate. =3 Such a license, representing an invest-
ment of at least hundreds of thousands of dollars and comparable
expected earnings, represents the licensee's livelihood, and its revo-
cation is a sanction of unquestionable severity.
B. The Eighty Dollar Rate Issue-Ordering WKKQ To Justify
Or Revise its Advertising Rate
1. Analysis of the Majority's Reasoning
While there is conflicting precedent and authority regarding
the access issue, there is no conflict or inconsistency on the rate
regulation issue, simply because there is no precedent or authority
authorizing the Commission to set, fix, or in any way regulate the
advertising rates broadcast stations charge to advertisers, political
or business.24
Initially, the majority cites the 1978 Political Primer as au-
thority for its decision: "[A] station's charging higher than its regu-
lar commercial rates for political broadcasts that are not 'uses'
might raise serious questions as to whether the station was serving
the public interest." The reasoning was that similar questions
were raised by WKKQ charging a rate for the 5-minute ad that was
thirteen times its 1-minute rate. It was the concern that such rate
might have the effect, or even the intention, of discouraging
purchase of the 5-minute ads.
This statement from the crevices of the 1978 Political Primer
unquestionably does not stand as authority for the majority's con-
clusion, because it was admittedly taken completely out of context
22 See Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951).
m Id. at 231. In Jordan, the penalty was deportation. Id.
m 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(1976).
"I The FCC has not ignored the problem of rates charged candidates by licensees. Its
activity in this area, however, has been limited. Under § 315(b), the FCC may act to ensure
that the lowest unit charge is being afforded a political advertiser. E.g., RKO Gen. Inc.,
61 F.C.C.2d 1183, 1184 (1976); see note 15 supra. In addition, it has ruled frequently that
free access is not mandated by § 312(a)(7). See, e.g., Dennis J. Morrisseau, 48 F.C.C.2d 436,
436-37, aff'd, 380 F. Supp. 512 (D. Vt. 1974); Dr. Benjamin Spock, 44 F.C.C.2d 12, 20 (1973).
Further, it has indicated that it would upset seasonal rate changes if they are shown not to
be "bona fide." Anthony Martin-Trigona, 64 F.C.C.2d 1087, 1091 (1977).
2" 69 F.C.C.2d at 1268.
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and refers to situations in which the candidate is not heard and
therefore does not trigger the lowest unit charge provisions of sec-
tion 315(b) .22s Senator Anderson, however, was heard on his radio
ads and so was fully entitled to the lowest unit charge rates.
Neither oblivious to the total absence of any policy or case au-
thority for its conclusion, nor willing to do anything other than
simply ignore the precedential and statutory brick wall preventing
it from regulating broadcast rates, the majority chose alternate rea-
soning: that it was not regulating, fixing, or setting ad rates at all.
This constituted perhaps the only path out of the quagmire. De-
spite the protests of the majority,227 WKKQ plainly involved rate
regulation, and such regulation is unquestionably beyond the Com-
mission's statutory authority.
The result reached regulated WKKQ's 5-minute ad rate. Al-
though the station justified its rate, citing factors such as audience
loss, business sponsor alienation, and format disruption, the Com-
mission spurned those justifications and ordered WKKQ to either
otherwise justify its rate or revise it to a charge that would "bear a
reasonable relationship to the existing lowest unit charge for a spot
announcement." The response of the station, of course, was to
revise the 5-minute rate to one directly proportional to its 1-minute
rate. Thus, the Commission had determined the station's quoted
rate was unreasonable and had ordered it changed.
Beyond having set the WKKQ rate, this decision stands as ge-
neric ratemaking for the broadcast industry as well. With this case
as precedent, henceforth a broadcaster's political ad rates could be
scrutinized and ordered rolled back by the FCC if they were not
directly proportional to the 1-minute lowest unit charge rate. This
obviously constitutes rate regulation.2
21 Those instances where candidates do not appear or are not heard during the ad are
not "uses of broadcast facilities" within the meaning of § 315(b). Consequently, the equal
opportunities aspect of the fairness doctrine and the "lowest unit charges" which apply to
these ads are not triggered. See, e.g., Lane Denton, 61 F.C.C.2d 1163, 1165 (1976). Because
§ 315 only applies to "uses" by a legally qualified candidate, many FCC rulings deal with what
constitutes a use, e.g., Gioria W. Sage, 63 F.C.C.2d 148, 149 (1977); Sally V. Hawkins, 62
F.C.C.2d 86, 87 (1976); The American Independent Party, 62 F.C.C.2d 4, 10-11 (1976), and
whether the complainant is a legally qualified candidate, e.g., Socialist Workers Party, 66
F.C.C.2d 1080, 1084-85 (1976); Ken Bauder, 62 F.C.C.2d 849, 849 (1976).
"1 69 F.C.C.2d at 1267.
21 Id. at 1268.
I" Because questions about rates charged to political candidates by a licensee usually
arise in a context where there is a rate for commercial ads of the type and length requested
by the candidate, e.g., Mrs. Joyce Burland, 48 F.C.C.2d 1086, 1087 (1974), the FCC has
never been in the position where its order resulted in the licensee's creation of a new rate
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2. The Distinction Between Common Carrier and Broadcast
Regulation
The Communications Act of 1934 empowers the FCC to regu-
late only the rates charged by interstate communications common
carriers. 0 Armed with such mandate, the Commission, with a cer-
tain degree of public visibility, expends a great deal of regulatory
energy, resources, and manpower ensuring that the rates charged
by telephone, telegraph, and communications satellite companies
are "just and reasonable. '3 Determining the reasonableness of
rates is the cornerstone of the Commission's common carrier
jurisdiction.
The Act does not grant the FCC the authority to regulate the
rates or charges of any other communication modes; only rates
charged by common carriers can be regulated. In drafting, debat-
ing, enacting, and amending the Communications Act over the de-
cades, the Congress has made one point explicitly clear: "[A] per-
son engaged in radio broadcasting shall not . . . be deemed a
common carrier. ' ' 2
The legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927, the precursor
and touchstone of the 1934 Act and the legislation after which the
1934 Act was substantially modeled, indicates that attempts by
certain members of the Congress to classify radio stations as com-
mon carriers were deliberately rejected.23 One proponent, Con-
gressman Davis, unsuccessfully argued: "[W]e are going to have to
regulate the radio public utilities just as we regulate other public
utilities. We are going to have to regulate the rates and the service
... Y '23Articulating the prevailing, sentiment, Senator Dill
charge until now. Cf. Council for Employment and Economic Energy Use v. FCC, 575 F.2d
311, 313-14 (1st Cir. 1978) (not unreasonable for FCC to allow licensee to give free time to
rebut paid ad in single instance where rebutting organization might have been able to pay).
47 U.S.C. §§ 201-205 (1976). A communications common carrier is one who "makes a
public offering to provide, for hire, . . . facilities by wire or radio whereby all members of
the public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or transmit intelligence of
their own design and choosing between points on the system of that carrier." Amendment of
Parts 2, 91, and 99 of the Commission's Rules Insofar as They Relate to the Industrial Radi-
olocation Service, 5 F.C.C.2d 197, 202 (1966) (citation omitted).
"' 47 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1976). Section 205 provides in pertinent part:
[If] the Commission shall be of [the] opinion that any charge . . . is or will be in
violation . . . of this chapter, the Commission is authorized and empowered to
determine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable charge . . . or
charges to be thereafter observed, . . . and to make an order that the carrier or
carriers shall cease and desist from such violation . . ..
= 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
21 See notes 131-32 and accompanying text infra.
21 67 CONG. REC. 5247 (1926)(remarks of REP. DAvis); accord, 67 CONG. REC. 12,503 (1926)
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countered: "[Ilt seemed unwise to put the broadcaster under the
hampering control of being a common carrier and compelled to
accept anything and everything that was offered him so long as the
price was paid. ' 2:1
Likewise, the courts have unequivocally held the Commission
to the distinction between common carriage and broadcasting. The
Supreme Court has acknowledged the clear statutory language on
the issue, and has noted the legislative history revealing the delib-
erateness with which Congress excluded radio broadcasting from
the common carrier definitional and regulatory category. 6
Most recently, the Supreme Court set aside Commission rules
that required certain cable television systems to provide access
channels and facilities in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.237 The effect
of the rules23s was to "prescribe a series of interrelated obligations
ensuring public access to cable systems of a designated size and
regulate the manner in which access is to be afforded and the
charges that may be levied for providing it. 23s Cable TV operators
had protested that the access channel rules deprived "the cable op-
erator of the power to select individual users or to control the pro-
gramming on such channels, [and thus] the regulations wrest[ed] a
considerable degree of editorial control from the cable operator and
in effect compel[led] the cable system to provide a kind of common
carrier service. ' '240
At the outset of the proceedings, the Commission admitted
that "common carrier obligations . . . are beyond our authority to
impose. '24' Its position in the case, however, similar to its position
(remarks of Sen. Howell). Those favoring classifying broadcasters as common carriers were
concerned with the possibility that a few private persons would control what the public hears.
For a brief discussion of the development of the Communications Act and the problem of
common carriage, see Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 103-09 (1973).
215 67 CONG. REc. 12,515 (1926)(remarks of Sen. Dill). Senator Dill and others were
concerined that imposing common carriage obligations on the broadcaster, combined with
equal opportunity obligations, would inundate a licensee with public discussions by private
individuals. In 1973, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a private right of access to
broadcast facilities for just this reason. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 120-27 (1973).
211 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 103-09.
-7 440 U.S. 689 (1979). See generally Comment, FCC Regulation of Cable Television, 54
N.Y.U.L. REV. 204 (1979).
CABLE TELEVISION REPORT AND ORDER (Doc. No. 20508), 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976).
'9 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 691 (1979).
241 Id. at 699.
241 CABLE TELEVISION REPORT AND ORDER, supra note 238, at 299.
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in the WKKQ case, was that the access channel requirements did
not impose common carrier obligations nor did the Commission's
action in adopting them constitute common carrier rate or service
regulation. Insisted the FCC: "[W]e do not think [the access rules]
can be held beyond our authority merely by denominating them as
somehow 'common carrier' in nature. 2 2 Yet, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit was unpersuaded and held the rules in ques-
tion imposed common carrier obligations on cable television sys-
tems contrary to the express language of the Communications Act
that broadcasting is not to be regulated by the FCC as common
carriage. 3
On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision with
forceful language regarding the common carrier issues. Reasoned
the Court: "Effectively, the Commission has relegated cable sys-
tems, pro tanto, to common-carrier status."2 " Such imposition,
concluded the Court, was beyond the statutory authority of the
FCC: "The Commission is directed explicitly by § 3(h) of the Act
not to treat persons engaged in broadcasting as common carriers.1 245
Elaborating, the decision continued: "The language of § 3(h) . . .
forecloses any discretion in the Commission to impose access
requirements amounting to common-carrier obligations on broad-
cast systems. 2 46
The relevance of the Midwest Video case to WKKQ is obvious
and constitutes strong, contemporary authority for the proposition
that the FCC cannot, inter alia, impose common carrier rate obli-
gations on broadcasters even though the Commission insists while
doing so that it, in reality, is not.
From 1934 until the 1978 WKKQ decision, the FCC had un-
failingly respected the clear statutory language. The Commission
had even recently emphasized the issue: "The Communications
Act makes a fundamental distinction between common carrier and
broadcast regulation .... ,1247 Obliquely implicit in the WKKQ
242 Id.
243 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), afl'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); see Comment, FCC Regula-
tion of Cable Television, 54 N.Y.U.L. REv. 204, 212-15 (1979).
21" 440 U.S. at 699-700 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
245 Id.
216 Id. at 705 (footnote omitted). At this point, the Court was quick to assert that this
holding did not foreclose "less intrusive regulation" from being promulgated by the FCC. Id.
at 705 n.14.
2,1 See, e.g., Development of Policy re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of
Broadcast Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 859 (1976).
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majority's discussion of the rate issue, however, is the notion that
section 312(a)(7) or section 315(b) authorizes the Commission to
determine the reasonableness of advertising rates. 48 That is plainly
not the case. Section 312(a)(7) mandates "reasonable access to or
to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time. 1249 The section
speaks in terms of amounts of time that must be made available to
candidates; it ensures their right to reasonable amounts of time to
communicate with the electorate. The purpose of the reasonable
access provision was explained by Senator Pastore, one of its spon-
sors, in these terms: "It attempts to give candidates for public of-
fice greater access to the media so that they may better explain
their stand on the issues, and thereby more fully and completely
inform the voters."' 0
It is the total amount of time a station offers a candidate that
must be reasonable-not the rate charged by the station.251 There is
241 See 69 F.C.C.2d at 1266-68. The rationale represents the view of two commissioners
that a reasonable rate is mandated by § 312(a)(7). They reason that an unreasonable rate
could discourage a candidate's making use of his right to reasonable access in direct opposi-
tion to the aim of the statute. Further, a licensee's setting such an unreasonably high rate
may be some evidence that a licensee intends to violate his obligation to afford reasonable
access. Id. at 1268. Dissenting, Commissioner White stated that such an "expansion" of
§ 312(a)(7) to cover the reasonableness of rates charged is "unprecedented" and "beyond the
intent of Congress and the Commission's statutory authority." Id. at 1271 (White, Comm'r,
dissenting). But see Reasonable Access, note 4 supra, at 1292 nn. 23-24. The exactness with
which Congress delineated the rate-supervision powers of the FCC over common carriers
makes the silence of § 312 (a) (7) in this regard resound. In support of the Commission's
rationale, however, it seems at least possible that Congress did not foresee a situation where a
licensee would not have a commercial rate for every type and length of ad which could be
applied to political advertisers.
249 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976).
117 CoNs. REC. 28,792 (1971). But cf. S. REP. No. 229, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1971),
reprinted in [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1821, 1822; S. REP. No. 96, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 20 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1773, 1774 (desire to control
costs of political campaigning). While § 315(a) is discussed at length, § 312(a)(7) is given
scant attention. Discussion of its aim is limited to saying that the reasonable access
requirement is but a codification of the already-existing obligation of a licensee to permit use
of its facilities in the public interest. S. REP. No. 96, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1971), reprinted in
119721 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEws 1773, 1787. In fact, the House version of the Federal
Election Campaign Act had no provision comparable to the reasonable access requirement.
21 According to the statute and FCC interpretations of it, it is the access which must be
reasonable, not the total amount of time or the rate. The FCC, in evaluating complaints,
determines whether a licensee's conduct has denied the candidate reasonable access. Such
determination involves deciding whether the licensee's judgment to deny a candidate's re-
quest for time was unreasonable under the facts of the case or -made in bad faith. Typically,
the licensee's judgment regards the total time offered or a ban on certain length ads. Whe;e
a ban is involved, as in WKKQ that ban may be deemed "unreasonable" and therefore
violative of § 312(a)(7), even though the total amount of time may not be "unreasonable."
Usually, no question arises regarding a licensee's judgment about the rate to be charged
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not one word in section 312(a)(7) about rates, and its reasonable-
ness-of-time mandate cannot be twisted into a reasonableness-of-
rates requirement.
Nor does section 315(b) grant the Commission authority to es-
tablish rates, although the section does impose rate obligations on
licensees. In pertinent part, those are: "The charges . . . shall not
exceed (1) . . . the lowest unit charge of the station for the same
class and amount of time for the same period .... "2 The legisla-
tive history reveals that the lowest unit charge provision "[does] no
more than place the candidate on par with a broadcast station's
most favored commercial advertiser." ' 3
In WKKQ, of course, the station had not previously offered 5-
minute ads to any commercial advertisers it had no 5-minute low-
est charge rate. The majority stated it was thus the responsibility
of the station to set a 5-minute lowest unit charge rate for Senator
Anderson. The majority's argument is that such a rate must bear a
reasonable relationship to the 1-minute lowest unit charge rate and
that absent such relationship the rate is ipso facto unreasonable.
The result, according to this argument, is that the unreasonable
rate would discourage candidates from buying time and that such
discouragement would "thwart the underlying purpose of the rea-
sonable access provisions."' 4
Nothing in section 315(b) can be so construed. The section ap-
plies only to rates already in existence.25 It empowers the FCC to
take notice of these existing rates, ascertain the lowest rate availa-
ble to volume business advertisers, and insure that candidates are
because this rate has been set previously for commercial advertisers.
22 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1976).
2 S. REP. No. 96, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1773, 1780. See notes 234-35 supra.
21' 69 F.C.C.2d at 1268.
2" That § 315(b) applies to existing rates can be gleaned from its legislative history:
[Section 315(b)] was enacted in 1952 to correct an abuse by some broadcasters who
were charging candidates for public office rates in excess of those charged commer-
cial advertisers for . . . comparable time. ...
In this context requiring broadcasters to offer candidates for public office the
same rates given their most favored commercial buyers is nothing more than a
particularization of the broad public interest obligation incumbent on them.
S. REP. No. 96, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1773, 1775. It seems, however, that Congress did not foresee a situation where there
would not be a commercial rate to be used for comparison, for the same report declared: "All
commercial radio and television stations have published rate cards which purport to state
the rates at which they sell spot and program time." Id. at 22, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 1780.
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placed on a pricing par with those business advertisers. Section
315(b) contains not one word about restricting political ad rates,
such as WKKQ had to set, for time segments never before offered
for sale, which existed along and which could not be compared to
business advertiser rates charged for similar length segments.
Thus, as the sections of the Act authorizing and defining the
Commission's powers prohibit radio rate regulation, the political
broadcast sections cannot be read to permit such a radical depar-
ture from more than 5 decades of communications regulation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is submitted upon the foregoing analysis that
the WKKQ decision is in error on any of several grounds, including
unexplained inconsistencies in precedent, the first amendment pro-
scription on the Commission substituting its judgment for that of
the licensee, the fifth amendment due process deficiencies, and the
unauthorized intervention of the Commission into the area of
broadcast rate regulation.
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